Δημοκρατική Παράταξη (DIPA – Democratic Front)
EU RANK: 112 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)
DIPA is a centrist party formed by former DISY members that positions itself as pro‑EU, reformist and pragmatic, aiming to bridge divides between left and right on economic and Cyprus‑settlement issues. It plays a kingmaker role in parliament and has supported different presidents and coalitions on a case‑by‑case basis.
Disinformation and alternative media
DIPA communicates mainly via mainstream television, online portals and social media; it does not control major media assets. Its discourse focuses on technocratic governance, reforms and economic stability rather than polarising cultural or identity issues.
We did not identify DIPA‑linked outlets at the core of Cypriot disinformation networks; when it amplifies dubious narratives, this usually reflects wider elite consensus rather than organised campaigns. Disinformation/alternative‑media risk is low–medium.
Foreign influence and external alignments
DIPA is clearly pro‑EU and pro‑Western, advocating close alignment with EU economic and foreign‑policy decisions and a pragmatic, UN‑framed settlement of the Cyprus problem. It supports sanctions against Russia and backs closer security ties with other EU states and NATO partners while stressing Cyprus’s role as a regional hub.
There is no public evidence of structural links between DIPA and Russian, Turkish or other authoritarian influence networks; its vulnerability is mainly systemic through Cyprus’s overall exposure in sectors like corporate services. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is low–medium.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
As a relatively new and mid‑sized party, DIPA lacks deep control over state‑owned enterprises or the public broadcaster RIK, relying instead on negotiated access with existing media. It has supported reforms to enhance transparency in state advertising and media ownership but has not championed far‑reaching structural changes to tackle media capture.
Given its limited patronage resources, DIPA’s direct media‑capture capacity is modest. Media‑capture risk is low–medium.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation records show few notable corruption cases centred on DIPA figures between 2015 and 2025. Some of its leading politicians previously held roles in administrations associated with scandals such as the passports scheme, which raises questions about legacy networks, but direct legal exposure for DIPA as a party remains limited.
The party’s small size and technocratic branding create some internal pressure to maintain a clean image. Overall corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is medium.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
DIPA publicly supports media pluralism and RIK’s independence, criticising overt political interference by larger parties. It has not been associated with campaigns of legal or economic harassment against journalists; disputes with outlets tend to be conventional political disagreements.
Because it does not command large advertising budgets or regulatory power, its ability to influence media behaviour—positively or negatively—is limited. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is low–medium.