Българска социалистическа партия (BSP)/Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
EU RANK: 152 (Tier 4: Low Performance)
The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) is the main successor of the former communist party and traditionally the largest left‑wing force in Bulgaria. It is socially conservative on some cultural issues, supports a significant welfare state and maintains a more ambivalent stance towards aspects of EU and NATO policy than liberal and centre‑right competitors. BSP’s electoral strength has declined in recent years, but it remains represented in parliament and continues to lead or co‑lead some local governments.
Disinformation and alternative media
BSP uses mainstream television, print and online media, party newspapers and social‑media channels for communication, and has connections to a cluster of legacy outlets historically sympathetic to its positions. Its rhetoric is more statist and socially conservative than left‑liberal and often critical of market reforms and some Euro‑Atlantic policies, but it generally avoids the most extreme conspiracy narratives.
Studies of the Bulgarian disinformation landscape note that some pro‑Kremlin narratives around Ukraine, sanctions and “traditional values” circulate in media and social‑media spaces overlapping with parts of the socialist electorate and commentariat. However, far‑right and openly pro‑Kremlin actors like Revival are usually identified as the principal domestic hubs for systematic disinformation. BSP’s disinformation/alternative‑media risk is medium: exposure to and occasional echoing of narratives favoured by Russian state media, without being the primary driver.
Foreign influence and external alignments
BSP is formally pro‑EU and pro‑NATO but more sceptical than other mainstream parties about sanctions, military deployments and alignment with some Western security agendas. It has historically maintained warmer attitudes towards Russia, reflecting parts of its electorate and ideological tradition, and has opposed or sought to soften some sanction and arms‑delivery packages.
This posture increases vulnerability to Russian soft‑power and information influence, even if it does not translate into proven direct operational links. BSP’s foreign‑influence DMI risk is medium–high.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
In government and in local strongholds, BSP has used similar instruments as other large parties, control over public enterprises, municipal advertising and regulatory appointments, to support friendly outlets and networks, though in recent years it has had less national‑level leverage than GERB. Some regional media landscapes remain heavily shaped by socialist‑linked actors and patronage structures dating back to the transition period.
BSP supports public service media in principle but has at times aligned with other parties in political appointments and budget negotiations that erode editorial independence. Its media‑capture risk is medium: less dominant than GERB in the current phase but part of the same clientelist logic.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
The BSP’s long history in government and local power inevitably links it to corruption and patronage cases across the transition period, including scandals involving public companies, privatisations and municipal governance. In the 2015–2025 period, several socialist‑linked figures have faced investigations or allegations, though the headline state‑capture narrative has focused more heavily on GERB‑centred networks.
Party‑funding data show reliance on public subsidies and traditional structures, with fewer ties to the newer oligarchic media‑business conglomerates tied to GERB or DPS, but the party remains embedded in Bulgaria’s broader patronage system. DMI corruption and institutional‑integrity risk is medium.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
BSP’s discourse formally supports press freedom and public broadcasting, yet local journalists and watchdogs have documented instances where socialist‑controlled municipalities and public entities have steered advertising and access in ways that favour loyal outlets and marginalise critics. At the national level, BSP politicians criticise perceived right‑wing bias in some media, but they do not systematically vilify journalism as such.
The main DMI concern is structural: participation in opaque advertising and governance arrangements that undermine the independence of local and regional media rather than direct physical threats or mass harassment campaigns. BSP’s press‑freedom and harassment risk is medium.