ГЕРБ-СДС (GERB-SDS)

EU RANK: 162 (Tier 4: Low Performance)

ГЕРБ-СДС is an electoral alliance centred on Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), a centre‑right, pro‑EU party led by Boyko Borissov, combined with the smaller Union of Democratic Forces (SDS). GERB dominated Bulgarian politics for much of the period since 2009, leading several governments and building extensive networks in the state administration and local authorities. Allegations of state capture, corruption and misuse of EU funds against GERB‑linked structures have been central to recent political crises and protest waves.

Disinformation and alternative media

GERB-SDS relies on major television channels, print and online outlets as well as extensive social‑media campaigning, but it is not associated with a separate conspiratorial alternative‑media ecosystem comparable to some nationalist actors. Its rhetoric is generally pro‑EU and pro‑NATO, though party figures sometimes engage in sharp attacks on opponents and investigative journalists who report on corruption scandals.

Bulgarian disinformation mapping emphasises pro‑Kremlin networks and radical parties like Revival rather than GERB as core producers of systematic falsehoods, but some GERB‑friendly outlets have been criticised for smear campaigns and biased coverage during political crises. Overall disinformation/alternative‑media risk is medium: not a primary conspiratorial hub but an actor that benefits from sympathetic, sometimes partisan media structures.

Foreign influence and external alignments

GERB-SDS is formally pro‑EU and pro‑NATO and integrated into the European People’s Party family. It supports sanctions against Russia and other authoritarian regimes, though critics argue that under GERB governments energy and economic ties with Russia remained substantial and at times politically exploited.

EU and national reports on foreign interference focus more on structural vulnerabilities in Bulgaria’s state and media than on direct alignment of GERB with Russian agendas, but the coexistence of pro‑Western rhetoric with opaque networks in energy and security has raised concerns. DMI foreign‑influence risk is medium: a formally Western‑oriented party whose past governance created openings for external leverage.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Research on Bulgaria repeatedly identifies GERB’s long period in power as central to the development of media capture, through control of state advertising, public companies’ budgets, EU funds and regulatory bodies. Oligarchs and business groups close to GERB gained or maintained ownership of major outlets, while critical media and journalists reported pressure, exclusion from advertising and attacks by pro‑government commentators.​

Under GERB‑led governments, the public broadcaster BNT faced political and financial pressures and leadership changes that watchdogs viewed as undermining independence. DMI media‑capture risk for GERB – SDS is high.​

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

GERB’s governance has been at the centre of numerous corruption allegations, from misuse of EU funds and public procurement to illegal wiretapping, police violence and politicisation of the prosecution service. The party’s dominance in many municipalities and public enterprises fostered extensive patronage networks; investigative reports and EU bodies have flagged serious rule‑of‑law concerns and deficiencies in anti‑corruption enforcement under GERB governments.

Some GERB officials have faced investigations and proceedings, though critics argue that the prosecution service has protected high‑ranking figures. GERB – SDS carries a high DMI corruption and institutional‑integrity risk.​

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

Bulgaria’s decline in press‑freedom rankings over the last decade is closely associated with media capture and harassment patterns developed under GERB’s rule. Journalists and outlets investigating corruption, organised crime or state capture reported smear campaigns, threats, restricted access and pressure through regulators and tax authorities, while pro‑government media were favoured with state advertising and political access.​​

Although formal censorship was not introduced, the combination of economic pressure, legal threats and hostile rhetoric created a chilling effect, especially outside Sofia. DMI press‑freedom and harassment risk for GERB-SDS is high.​

DimensionRisk levelShort justification
Disinformation & alternative mediaMediumUses mainstream outlets and enjoys support from partisan media; systemic disinformation hubs are elsewhere but smear‑style coverage has been documented.​
Foreign influence & external alignmentsMediumOfficially pro‑EU/NATO but governed amid deep Russian energy and economic penetration, raising exposure to external leverage.​
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB controlHighLong‑term control of state resources and regulators enabled an oligarchic media environment and pressure on BNT and critical outlets.​
Corruption & institutional‑integrity riskHighCentral to major corruption and state‑capture allegations, with extensive patronage networks and multiple investigations.
Press‑freedom & harassment of mediaHighDeclining press‑freedom indicators linked to economic and political pressure on independent media under GERB governments.​