Има такъв народ (ITN)/There is Such a People

EU RANK: 164 (Tier 4: Low Performance)

Има такъв народ (ITN) is a populist party founded by entertainer Slavi Trifonov, combining anti‑establishment rhetoric, nationalism and elements of direct‑democracy discourse. It broke into parliament in 2021 on a wave of disillusionment with the GERB‑DPS system and briefly held the initiative in coalition talks before internal conflicts and unstable alliances eroded its position. ITN’s support has since decreased but it remains a recognised protest‑style actor in Bulgarian politics.​​

Disinformation and alternative media

ITN relies heavily on television and online audiences built by Trifonov’s previous show, as well as party social‑media channels. Its communication style is personalistic, confrontational and often uses entertainment formats, but it has not developed a distinct conspiratorial media ecosystem on the scale of radical‑right parties.

Some of ITN’s messaging has included vague or contradictory claims on vaccines, foreign policy and institutional conspiracies, particularly in the early pandemic and post‑protest period, raising concerns about the blurring of lines between scepticism and misinformation. Bulgarian disinformation studies, however, tend to treat it as a secondary actor behind more coherent pro‑Kremlin or ultra‑nationalist networks. Its disinformation/alternative‑media risk is medium.

Foreign influence and external alignments

ITN presents itself as pro‑EU and pro‑NATO but stresses “national interest” and scepticism towards elites, sometimes adopting ambiguous positions on sanctions or security decisions. It has not developed a clear foreign‑policy doctrine, and party statements on Russia, Ukraine and Western alliances have occasionally appeared inconsistent.​​

There is no strong evidence of direct ITN alignment with Russian or other authoritarian state strategies, but the party’s unpredictable positions can create openings for hostile narratives to circulate among its supporters. DMI foreign‑influence risk is medium.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

ITN’s strength has never rested on control of state institutions or public enterprises; its short‑lived role in government did not allow it to build structural levers for media capture comparable to GERB or DPS. Its main media asset remains Slavi Trifonov’s brand and audience rather than ownership of major outlets.

The party is critical of public service media for perceived bias, but it has not yet demonstrated systematic attempts to capture BNT or BNR through appointments and budgetary control. Its media‑capture risk is low–medium: rhetorical pressure without entrenched structural power.​

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

ITN entered politics on an anti‑corruption and anti‑elite platform and has not been associated with major corruption schemes or state‑capture networks comparable to those linked to GERB and DPS. Internal party dynamics, lack of transparency in decision‑making and abrupt political manoeuvres have raised questions about accountability but not about large‑scale graft.

Litigation records for 2015–2025 do not feature ITN at the centre of major corruption trials. Its DMI corruption and institutional‑integrity risk is low–medium.​

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

ITN leaders, especially Trifonov, are often harshly critical of journalists and outlets they perceive as hostile, using strong language and personal attacks. This rhetoric can contribute to an atmosphere in which journalists covering ITN or its leader face online abuse from supporters.​​

However, ITN has not held enough institutional power to convert this hostility into structural repression or capture of media. Its DMI press‑freedom and harassment risk is medium: notable verbal attacks but limited ability to operationalise them through state levers.​​

DimensionRisk levelShort justification
Disinformation & alternative mediaMediumRelies on personality‑driven communication with occasional ambiguous or conspiratorial hints, but not a primary disinfo hub.
Foreign influence & external alignmentsMediumFormally pro‑EU/NATO yet inconsistent on sanctions and security, creating space for hostile narratives without clear operational ties.​
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB controlLow–MediumLimited time in office and few structural levers; mostly rhetorical pressure on public media.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity riskLow–MediumAnti‑elite profile with no major corruption cases so far; internal opacity remains a concern.
Press‑freedom & harassment of mediaMediumFrequent sharp attacks on journalists encourage online harassment, but institutional tools for repression remain weak.