Продължаваме промяната-Демократична България / We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB)
EU RANK: 80 (Tier 2: High Performance)
Продължаваме промяната – Демократична България (PP‑DB) is a centrist, reformist electoral alliance combining the liberal, anti‑corruption movement “We Continue the Change” (PP) with the pro‑EU right‑of‑centre Democratic Bulgaria. It emerged from the protest wave of 2020–2021 against state capture and corruption and quickly became a key pole in Bulgarian politics, alternating between government participation and opposition in the unstable cycles of 2021–2024. The bloc presents itself as a modernising force pushing for rule‑of‑law reforms, judicial independence and integration into the Eurozone and Schengen.
Disinformation and alternative media
PP‑DB relies mainly on mainstream television, online news outlets and its own social‑media channels, and does not control a large‑scale partisan media conglomerate. Its messaging focuses on corruption, state capture, institutional reform and European integration, framed in technocratic and pro‑Western terms rather than conspiratorial rhetoric. Mapping of the Bulgarian disinformation space highlights pro‑Kremlin networks and nationalist actors as principal domestic vectors of falsehoods and manipulative narratives, not PP‑DB.
The alliance advocates stronger regulation and transparency for online platforms and supports fact‑checking initiatives and media‑literacy projects as tools against disinformation. There is no evidence of systematic disinformation campaigns orchestrated by PP‑DB. Its disinformation and alternative‑media risk is low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
PP‑DB is firmly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO, prioritising alignment with Western partners, support for Ukraine and diversification away from Russian energy and strategic dependencies. It backs EU sanctions against Russia and measures against other authoritarian regimes, and supports EU‑level efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and hybrid threats.
Bulgarian and EU analyses of foreign interference point to long‑standing Russian influence channels in politics, business and media, yet PP‑DB is usually described as a political force seeking to reduce that influence, not as a conduit. Its foreign‑influence DMI risk is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
PP‑DB built its identity around opposition to media capture and oligarchic control, particularly the network associated with Delyan Peevski and other business‑political groups. It has pledged to reform public advertising rules, improve transparency in media ownership and strengthen the independence and funding of Bulgarian National Television (BNT) and Bulgarian National Radio (BNR).
In government, parts of the alliance held portfolios with potential influence over public communication budgets and media regulation, but its relatively short and turbulent tenure limited its capacity to reshape long‑entrenched patronage systems. DMI media‑capture risk is low–medium: a reformist actor embedded in the same institutional framework, with declared intentions to reduce capture rather than extend it.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
The alliance’s core narrative is anti‑corruption and anti‑state capture; it rose on the back of protests against oligarchic networks and the GERB‑DPS system. Party‑funding data show that PP‑DB components rely primarily on public subsidies and individual donations, with limited ties to big domestic business compared to established parties, although scrutiny of procurement, appointments and potential conflicts of interest remains necessary when it is in office.
The litigation record since 2015 does not feature large‑scale corruption cases centred on PP‑DB leaders comparable to headline scandals involving older parties. Its DMI corruption and institutional‑integrity risk is low–medium: a self‑proclaimed clean‑up force whose medium‑term record still needs to be monitored as it gains governing experience.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
PP‑DB positions itself as a defender of free media and pluralism against oligarchic control and political intimidation. It favours stronger protections for investigative journalists, improved safeguards against SLAPPs and reforms that would shield BNT and BNR from political interference, in line with EU standards.
Alliance representatives criticise captured or oligarch‑dominated outlets but do not generally portray journalism as an enemy; they seek alliances with independent media in the wider struggle against corruption rather than campaigns of harassment. DMI press‑freedom and harassment risk is low.