Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα (DIKO – Democratic Party)
EU RANK: 121 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)
DIKO is a centrist, Greek‑Cypriot nationalist party that often plays a pivotal role in forming governments, combining moderate economic policies with a relatively hard line on the Cyprus problem. It has supplied presidents, key ministers and parliamentary presidents and maintains dense networks in state institutions and semi‑public entities.
Disinformation and alternative media
DIKO’s communication relies on mainstream broadcasters, influential newspapers and portals, and party‑run platforms. Its rhetoric can be polarising on settlement issues, corruption allegations and relations with Turkey, but it generally avoids overtly conspiratorial or anti‑science narratives.
Some DIKO‑friendly commentators have been accused of spreading exaggerated or misleading claims during election campaigns, especially about opponents’ stance on the Cyprus issue, yet we did not find evidence of systematic fabrication comparable to far‑right disinformation hubs. Disinformation/alternative‑media risk is medium.
Foreign influence and external alignments
DIKO supports EU membership and cooperation with Western partners but is more cautious about NATO‑linked structures and often stresses Cyprus’s non‑aligned tradition. It promotes a tougher stance towards Turkey, including sanctions and stronger security ties with Greece and other regional partners.
The party has historically been courted by external actors interested in Cyprus’s energy and financial services sectors, yet there is limited public evidence of DIKO as a direct vehicle for Russian or other authoritarian influence; rather, it operates within a political‑business environment where such capital is present. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is medium.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Our media‑influence mapping highlights DIKO’s long‑term entanglements with certain private broadcasters, newspapers and business groups, often through shared ownership, personal ties and advertising flows. When in government or supporting presidents, DIKO has participated in appointment processes at RIK, regulatory authorities and semi‑public boards, contributing to the broader pattern of politicised governance.
State and parastatal advertising has at times been channelled to outlets perceived as close to DIKO and its allies, reinforcing clientelist dependencies. Media‑capture DMI risk is medium–high.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation data show several corruption and abuse‑of‑office investigations involving DIKO‑linked officials, especially in public procurement, land development and the passports scheme. While not uniquely responsible for systemic corruption, DIKO has repeatedly been implicated in scandals that reveal close ties between politicians, lawyers, developers and service providers.
Despite public anti‑corruption rhetoric, the party has not consistently championed structural reforms that would undermine these networks. Overall corruption and institutional‑integrity risk is high.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
DIKO leaders maintain tense relations with critical media, particularly outlets exposing corruption or challenging its stance on the Cyprus issue, yet they mostly use political rebuttals rather than overt legal repression. Economic leverage via advertising and privileged access is more significant: friendly outlets tend to receive better information flows and advertising, while critical ones risk marginalisation.
The party supports RIK’s public‑service role in principle but has backed politicised board and management appointments when in power. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is medium–high.