Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (KDU‑ČSL / Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party)
EU RANK: 51 (Tier 2: High Performance)
KDU‑ČSL is a centrist, Christian‑democratic party with strong roots in Moravia and smaller towns, advocating social market economics, family policies, EU integration and regional development. It is part of the SPOLU alliance with ODS and TOP 09 and has long experience in coalition governments, which gives it disproportionate influence relative to its vote share.
Disinformation and alternative media
KDU‑ČSL uses mainstream TV, print and online outlets plus party and church‑adjacent channels; it does not own significant commercial media. Its rhetoric is socially conservative on family and bioethics, but generally evidence‑based and clearly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO.
Our e‑research notes that KDU‑ČSL leaders have publicly rejected anti‑vaccine and strongly conspiratorial narratives circulating in some Christian circles, and cooperated with fact‑checking initiatives on migration and Ukraine. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is low–medium.
Foreign influence and external alignments
KDU‑ČSL is firmly pro‑EU and pro‑Atlantic, stresses solidarity with Ukraine and supports sanctions on Russia and Belarus as well as scrutiny of Chinese investments. It belongs to mainstream European Christian‑democratic networks and promotes a values‑based foreign policy focused on religious freedom and human rights.
There is no indication of structural ties to hostile‑state actors; concerns centre more on some conservative social‑policy alliances within Europe than on external adversaries. Foreign‑influence risk is low–medium.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
KDU‑ČSL does not command large oligarchic media, though it has traditional links to some Catholic and regional outlets. In government it has generally sided with partners defending the independence of Česká televize and Český rozhlas against overt political capture, including under President Zeman and Babiš.
At the municipal level, KDU‑ČSL mayors have some influence over local advertising and community media, but documented cases of systematic capture are limited. Media‑capture DMI risk is low–medium.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation files show sporadic cases involving KDU‑ČSL‑linked local officials in procurement or municipal management, but no large‑scale, party‑wide corruption scandals. The party’s historic roots and internal networks do create patronage patterns in some regions, yet overall watchdogs view it as less corruption‑prone than ANO or ODS.
Funding comes from public subsidies, membership contributions and mid‑sized business donors, with fewer links to the largest Czech oligarchs. Corruption and institutional‑integrity risk is medium.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
KDU‑ČSL supports public‑service media and independent journalism and has not been associated with legal or economic harassment campaigns against reporters. Some representatives criticise coverage they view as hostile to Christian values, but these disagreements are expressed in standard political debate rather than through threats or SLAPP‑type lawsuits.
Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is low–medium.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low–Medium | Uses mainstream and church‑adjacent channels; has rejected anti‑vaccine and conspiratorial narratives. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low–Medium | Pro‑EU/NATO Christian democrats; no hostile‑state ties. |
| Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control | Low–Medium | Limited media assets; generally backs PSB independence. |
| Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk | Medium | Some local patronage cases but no major national scandals. |
| Press‑freedom & harassment of media | Low–Medium | No pattern of harassment; occasional value‑based criticism of coverage only. |