Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (Conservative People’s Party of Estonia / EKRE)
EU RANK: 163 (Tier 4: Low Performance)
EKRE is a national‑conservative, right‑wing to far‑right party that combines hardline nationalism, anti‑immigration stances and cultural conservatism with Eurosceptic and protectionist economic positions. Led by Martin Helme and heavily shaped by the Helme family, it won 16.1% of the vote and 17 seats in the 2023 parliamentary election, remaining the third‑largest party and main right‑wing opposition force. EKRE’s support is concentrated in rural areas and among older or disaffected voters who feel alienated by liberal, cosmopolitan politics.
Disinformation and alternative media
EKRE has developed a dense ecosystem of sympathetic alternative and fringe media, including party‑linked portals, talk shows and social‑media channels that amplify polarising narratives on migration, gender, climate policy and “globalist elites”. Research for 2015–2025 documents repeated cases where EKRE politicians and aligned outlets have spread misleading or false claims about refugees, LGBTQ+ rights, EU climate measures and alleged election irregularities, often borrowing themes from broader European and US far‑right networks. While not every inaccurate claim is centrally coordinated, the party’s communication style normalises disinformation‑adjacent content and delegitimising rhetoric. Disinformation/alternative media risk is high.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Formally, EKRE supports Estonia’s NATO membership and security alliances, but it is strongly Eurosceptic, opposes deeper EU integration and has at times echoed narratives sympathetic to nationalist and illiberal governments in Hungary and elsewhere. There is no clear evidence of direct financial control by hostile foreign states, yet the party’s rhetorical overlaps with Kremlin‑friendly themes on migration, “Brussels elites” and climate policy raise concern about vulnerability to external influence operations. Its scepticism toward EU institutions and occasional criticism of sanctions and green policies place it at odds with Estonia’s mainstream foreign‑policy consensus. Foreign influence DMI risk is moderate to high (coded as high).
Media capture, advertising and public service media
EKRE does not control major legacy media companies but has invested heavily in party‑adjacent outlets and talk formats that act as de facto propaganda channels, giving it an outsized voice in the alternative information space. During its time in government (2019–2021), the party launched repeated attacks on ERR, accused public broadcasters of liberal bias, and floated ideas for restructuring or cutting funding that observers interpreted as attempts to intimidate and politically discipline public service media. Its campaigns also pressure commercial outlets through organised boycotts and public vilification of critical journalists. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is high.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation data for 2015–2025 show EKRE less associated with classic corruption or procurement scandals than some older parties, but its leadership has faced controversies over misuse of office, inflammatory statements and pressure on independent institutions. Its period in government was marked by confrontations with the judiciary, civil service and watchdogs, including attempts to politicise oversight bodies and public administration appointments. While not always translating into court convictions, these patterns raise concerns about the party’s commitment to checks and balances and institutional neutrality. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is moderate to high (coded as high in the index).
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
EKRE leaders frequently attack journalists as “globalist”, “left‑liberal” or “fake news”, encouraging supporters to distrust mainstream outlets and sometimes singling out individual reporters for ridicule and harassment. The party has repeatedly targeted ERR and critical private outlets, using verbal attacks, smear campaigns and threats of funding cuts, contributing to a climate of intimidation for some journalists covering migration, minority and corruption issues. This antagonistic posture towards the press is one of the sharpest in Estonia’s party system. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is high.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | High | Dense ecosystem of party‑aligned outlets; repeated spread of misleading claims on migration, gender, climate and elections; normalisation of disinformation‑adjacent narratives. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | High | NATO‑supporting but strongly Eurosceptic; rhetoric overlaps with broader illiberal and Kremlin‑compatible narratives, raising susceptibility to external influence. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | High | Builds party‑adjacent media; attacks and pressures ERR; uses threats of restructuring/funding cuts and vilification of critical outlets. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | High | Fewer classic graft cases but significant attempts to politicise institutions and weaken checks and balances during time in government. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | High | Aggressive rhetoric against journalists; naming‑and‑shaming practices; climate of intimidation for critical reporters and public service media. |
