Renaissance

EU RANK: 97 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)

Renaissance (formerly La République En Marche) is a liberal, pro-EU centrist party founded by Emmanuel Macron and anchored in the broader “presidential camp” (Ensemble). It promotes market-friendly reforms, European integration, and institutional “governability,” positioning itself against both the radical left and the far right. In the 2024 snap legislative elections, Renaissance won 98 seats within Ensemble’s 161, remaining a core bloc in a fragmented National Assembly. Its electorate is disproportionately urban and professional, with strong support among pro-EU, higher-education and higher-income voters, particularly in major metropolitan areas.

Disinformation and alternative media

According to our research on party communication and the French media ecosystem (2015–2025), Renaissance does not operate party-owned alternative media channels and generally relies on conventional news formats. The party benefits from institutional visibility and regular access to mainstream broadcasters (public channels and large private news outlets), especially through interviews, debates and government-centred reporting cycles. Our research also notes that the presidential camp has increasingly used digital-native formats to reach younger audiences (including collaborations and interviews with youth-reach outlets), but these remain within mainstream media culture rather than a parallel ecosystem. The main vulnerability for Renaissance is reputational rather than infrastructural: incumbency makes it a constant target in polarised online narratives, and adversarial talk-show environments can amplify anti-government frames even when the party itself is not pushing disinformation. Disinformation/alternative media risk is low.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Renaissance is structurally embedded in EU institutions and mainstream Western policy networks, with consistently pro-European alignments and strong institutional links through government participation. The funding and litigation records reviewed do not indicate foreign financial dependence or organisational ties to hostile foreign actors. The more relevant exposure is indirect: platform dynamics and cross-border information flows can amplify polarising narratives around incumbents, but this is not evidence of foreign patronage. Foreign influence DMI risk is low.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

According to our research, Renaissance does not own major media assets, and there is no evidence of systematic attempts to capture public service media governance. At the same time, incumbency can create perceptions of “soft influence” because government actors naturally receive high baseline coverage and have routine access to public broadcasters for institutional messaging. This perception risk is partly mitigated by France’s pluralism framework, which has tightened in 2024–2025 following court and regulatory developments, placing more emphasis on viewpoint diversity beyond simple airtime counting. Overall, the party’s media influence is primarily exposure-based (government visibility) rather than ownership- or appointment-based capture. Media capture, advertising and PSB-control DMI risk is low to moderate.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

According to our research, the governing camp’s litigation exposure is best understood as elevated individual-level risk rather than systemic party-level corruption. The 2015–2025 record includes high-profile cases and investigations involving senior officials associated with the presidential sphere (some resulting in acquittals or case closures, others producing adverse findings or ongoing proceedings). These episodes can shape perceptions of integrity, especially given the party’s governing role and the visibility of conflict-of-interest allegations in French political debate. On party finance, the presidential camp often channels subsidy flows through alliance vehicles (e.g., “Ensemble !” concentrating accounting lines), which is legal but can reduce public readability of party accounts. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is low to moderate.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

According to our research, Renaissance’s media posture is broadly institutional and does not typically rely on anti-media mobilisation. The party seeks legitimacy through mainstream outlets and public broadcasters and does not show a pattern of systematic harassment or exclusion of journalists. As with many incumbents, moments of tension can emerge around investigative reporting and politicised editorial ecosystems, but these pressures do not amount to a sustained strategy of intimidation. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is low.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Low	Primarily institutional and mainstream communications; no party-owned alternative media pipeline; exposure shaped by incumbency and polarised ecosystems rather than disinformation infrastructure.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Strong EU and Western institutional embedding; no foreign financial or organisational ties flagged in the records reviewed.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Low–Moderate	No ownership capture pattern, but incumbency brings structural visibility and recurring “soft influence” perceptions; mitigated by strengthened pluralism oversight.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	Low–Moderate	Notable individual-level legal exposure among prominent figures; party finance dominated by regulated public subsidy and alliance accounting vehicles.
Press freedom & harassment of media	Low	No systematic intimidation or exclusion pattern identified in our research; tensions are episodic and typical of incumbent scrutiny.