Die Linke (The Left)
EU RANK: 137 (Tier 4: Low Performance)
Die Linke is a democratic‑socialist party emphasising redistribution, expansive welfare, public ownership and scepticism toward NATO and neoliberal EU policies. In the 2025 federal election it won roughly 8.8% of the vote and around 64–69 seats, remaining an opposition party after the CDU/CSU–SPD grand coalition was formed. Its strength is concentrated in eastern Germany and among urban left‑leaning voters.
Disinformation and alternative media
Die Linke uses mainstream media, regional newspapers, party publications and social media; it also has ties to a small ecosystem of left‑wing online outlets and magazines, though these are more opinion‑driven than large‑scale “alternative media”. Research on 2015–2025 indicates sporadic cases where individual politicians or sympathetic platforms have shared controversial narratives on NATO, Ukraine and sanctions that overlap with Russian state messaging, but there is no evidence of a centrally coordinated disinformation operation. The party leadership has at times corrected or distanced itself from the most extreme claims. Disinformation/alternative media DMI risk is moderate.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Die Linke is critical of NATO and has long advocated détente and negotiated security arrangements with Russia, which drew sharper scrutiny after the 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine. Available litigation and funding records do not demonstrate direct financial control by hostile foreign governments, but the party’s foreign‑policy stance and some travel/contacts by individual figures have raised concerns about openness to Kremlin narratives. It remains formally committed to democracy and EU membership while opposing many EU economic and security policies. Foreign influence DMI risk is moderate.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Die Linke does not own major commercial media assets and has limited leverage over ARD/ZDF governance compared with larger parties. Its media ties revolve around left‑wing newspapers, small online platforms and trade‑union publications, none of which amount to systemic capture. There is no indication of the party using state advertising or regulatory pressure to shape media in its favour where it has participated in Länder governments. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is low.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Court and investigative records from 2015–2025 show few major corruption scandals centred on Die Linke’s federal leadership; most controversies involve internal conflicts, staff disputes or isolated local finance irregularities rather than large‑scale graft. Funding analysis portrays a reliance on public subsidies, membership contributions and trade‑union‑linked support, with compliance to federal reporting rules and no dominant oligarch donors. Overall integrity concerns are lower than for some larger parties, despite occasional mismanagement cases. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is low.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Die Linke officially supports strong protections for journalists, opposes surveillance overreach and often allies with civil‑liberties groups on press‑freedom issues. Party figures may sharply criticise mainstream outlets for perceived bias on security and economic questions, but research does not show systematic harassment campaigns, SLAPP‑type litigation, or threats of regulatory punishment against critical media. The party is more likely to campaign alongside journalists’ unions than to confront them. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is low.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Moderate | Uses small left‑wing media ecosystem; some actors echo controversial narratives on NATO/Ukraine, though no evidence of centrally coordinated disinformation. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Moderate | Democratic‑socialist but NATO‑sceptic; long‑standing soft line toward Russia raises vulnerability concerns despite lack of proven hostile‑state funding. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Low | No major media ownership or state‑advertising leverage; influence limited to small partisan outlets and union publications. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Low | Few significant corruption cases; mainly public funding and member dues with standard transparency obligations. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | Low | Publicly defends press freedom and civil liberties; no pattern of harassment or punitive action against journalists. |