Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement)
EU RANK: 199 (Tier 5: High Risk)
Mi Hazánk is a far‑right, ultranationalist party that split from Jobbik and promotes hardline positions on migration, Roma and LGBT issues, vaccine scepticism and radical “law and order”, while styling itself as an anti‑system alternative. It has secured parliamentary representation and regional strength despite its relatively recent formation.
Disinformation and alternative media
Mi Hazánk relies heavily on alternative and social‑media ecosystems, conspiracy‑oriented portals and fringe broadcasters that amplify anti‑Roma, anti‑migrant, anti‑LGBT and anti‑vaccine narratives. Monitoring of 2020–2025 shows party figures repeatedly spreading misleading claims about COVID‑19 measures, vaccines, “gender ideology” and alleged threats from minorities, placing it among Hungary’s most prominent far‑right disinformation actors. Its communication strategy intentionally undermines trust in mainstream media and scientific or institutional expertise. Disinformation/alternative media DMI risk is high.
Foreign influence and external alignments
The party is strongly Eurosceptic and critical of NATO, emphasising Hungarian sovereignty and often questioning sanctions on Russia and Western security policy. Litigation and funding records up to 2025 do not clearly document direct hostile‑state financing, but some of its narratives on Ukraine, the EU and “globalism” overlap closely with Kremlin and other illiberal messaging, heightening vulnerability to foreign influence even without proven financial ties. Its international contacts are mainly with European far‑right and ultra‑conservative networks. Foreign influence DMI risk is high.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Mi Hazánk does not control public broadcaster MTVA or major commercial media, which are dominated by Fidesz‑aligned structures, but it is heavily promoted by a network of far‑right and conspiracy‑leaning outlets that provide it substantial visibility. In localities where it has influence, there are concerns about pressure on municipal or community media, though systematic capture via state advertising is less documented than for Fidesz. Overall, its media power stems from disruptive alternative channels rather than formal institutions. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate to high (coded high due to its alternative‑media leverage).
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Court records for 2015–2025 mention Mi Hazánk mainly in relation to hate‑speech, assembly and public‑order cases rather than classic financial corruption, reflecting its recent emergence and limited control over state resources. Party‑funding data are relatively sparse but indicate reliance on public subsidies and donations, with concerns about transparency and the role of nationalist business circles but no fully mapped large‑scale graft schemes yet. Given its radical profile and potential for future patronage if it gains power, integrity risks are evaluated as elevated. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is moderate.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Mi Hazánk leaders routinely denounce critical journalists and outlets as “traitors”, “Soros agents” or enemies of the nation, and their events have seen intimidation and verbal abuse of reporters. The party’s rhetoric fuels online harassment and normalises hostile behaviour toward media covering minority and LGBT issues, contributing to a chilling effect particularly outside Budapest. While it has fewer tools than Fidesz to use regulatory or financial pressure, its discourse and supporter actions pose a serious threat to journalists’ safety and freedom. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is high.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | High | Central user of conspiracy‑oriented alternative media; repeatedly spreads misleading narratives on minorities, LGBT issues and vaccines. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | High | Strongly Eurosceptic and NATO‑critical with narratives overlapping Kremlin lines; no clear hostile‑state funding proven but high vulnerability. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | High | Lacks formal PSB control but wields strong influence via far‑right alternative media ecosystems that act as de facto propaganda channels. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Moderate | Limited access to state resources so far; some transparency concerns but no mapped large‑scale graft schemes yet. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | High | Aggressive anti‑media rhetoric and intimidation at events; contributes to harassment and fear among journalists, especially on minority/LGBT beats. |