Forza Italia (FI)

EU RANK: 135 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)

Forza Italia (FI) is a centre‑right, Christian‑democratic and liberal‑conservative party that has long represented a pro‑European, business‑friendly strand of Italian politics. In the 2022 general election it obtained 8.3% of the vote, while in the 2024 European Parliament election, running with Noi Moderati, it reached 9.6%, remaining the moderate pillar of the governing right‑of‑centre coalition. Since the death of founder Silvio Berlusconi in 2023 the party has been led by Antonio Tajani, who also serves as deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and under whom FI stresses Atlanticism, EU alignment and institutional continuity within the Meloni‑led government.​​

Disinformation and alternative media

Forza Italia’s communication strategy historically relied less on fringe alternative outlets and more on the integration of politics with Berlusconi’s commercial media empire, particularly Mediaset/MFE’s TV channels. These platforms provided favourable framing and agenda‑setting for FI but generally operated as mass‑audience broadcasters rather than conspiratorial niche media, blending news, infotainment and entertainment in ways that critics argued softened scrutiny of the party and its leader. Contemporary analyses of disinformation in Italy focus more on social‑media‑driven ecosystems and radical‑right networks than on FI as a party‑centred producer of false narratives, although infotainment formats in Berlusconi‑linked channels have occasionally been criticised for amplifying sensational or partisan frames.​

Under Tajani, FI has maintained a conventional approach to messaging, combining mainstream TV exposure, party channels and social media without developing an organised parallel disinformation infrastructure. While editorial sympathies in MFE’s outlets can still shape the environment in which FI operates, there is no evidence of a centrally directed campaign of systematic fabrication comparable to some foreign examples of party‑aligned propaganda networks.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Forza Italia is firmly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO, with Tajani emphasising continuity with Italy’s traditional Atlanticist and European‑integrationist orientations. The party supports sanctions against Russia, backing for Ukraine and close coordination with EU partners on security and economic policy, positioning itself as the most explicitly Euro‑Atlantic component of the current governing coalition. At the European level, FI belongs to the European People’s Party family and promotes centre‑right cooperation within that framework.​​

Concerns about external influence in Italian politics have sometimes referenced Berlusconi’s personal ties and statements regarding Russia’s leadership, but these did not translate into formal realignment of Italy’s foreign‑policy posture while FI held government responsibilities. Today, available evidence does not indicate structured dependence of FI on authoritarian regimes or their state‑aligned media; rather, the party operates as a mainstream conservative actor embedded in Euro‑Atlantic institutions.​​

Media capture, advertising and public service media

FI’s distinctive feature is its historic structural leverage over private broadcasting through the Berlusconi‑founded Mediaset, now MFE‑MediaForEurope, which remains a major commercial TV group in Italy. Even after the founder’s death, the Berlusconi family’s control over MFE means that FI’s broader political orbit is closely associated with a powerful media conglomerate whose editorial environments have often been favourable to centre‑right narratives. This long‑standing overlap between political leadership and media ownership has been at the centre of domestic and international concerns about media pluralism and conflicts of interest in Italy.​

At the same time, FI does not currently hold the key government posts responsible for RAI appointments, and recent accusations of public‑service media capture have focused more on Fratelli d’Italia’s stewardship of the broadcaster. Nonetheless, MFE’s expansion—including majority control of Germany’s ProSiebenSat.1 by 2025—strengthens the group’s cross‑border influence and keeps questions about the interaction between commercial TV power and FI’s political role on the agenda, even if direct party control is less personalised than in the Berlusconi era.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Forza Italia and its founder have been deeply intertwined with Italy’s judicial history over the last three decades, featuring numerous investigations and trials related to tax fraud, bribery, corruption and alleged links with organised crime. In the 2015–2025 window, key developments included Berlusconi’s acquittal in the “Ruby ter” witness‑bribery offshoot in 2023 and multiple defamation and related cases that shaped his later‑years legal profile. Other FI‑linked figures have faced serious proceedings: former senator Giancarlo Pittelli received an 11‑year first‑instance sentence in the Rinascita‑Scott Ndrangheta maxi‑trial for external complicity with mafia, while MEP Lara Comi was convicted in 2023 in the “Mensa dei Poveri” corruption probe, with appeals ongoing.​

Further, the 2024 Liguria corruption investigation involving regional president Giovanni Toti—politically allied with FI and Lega—highlighted allegations of bribe‑for‑favours around port concessions, leading to Toti’s house arrest and resignation before a plea‑bargain process. These cases underscore persistent integrity risks in parts of FI’s orbit, even as some high‑profile proceedings against Berlusconi himself ended in acquittal. Financially, the party relies on both public “2×1000” subsidies—around €0.8 million per year in recent declarations—and private contributions, with 2023 accounts recording roughly €1.35 million in donations, illustrating a funding model that continues to raise questions about donor influence and legacy networks.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media

FI’s impact on press freedom is closely tied to the structural concentration of media ownership in the Berlusconi/MFE orbit, which has long raised concerns about the ability of critical voices to secure equal access to audiences and about the blurring of boundaries between political and commercial interests. While Italian media remain pluralistic, watchdogs have repeatedly noted that the prominence of Berlusconi‑linked channels, combined with FI’s historical government roles, contributed to a climate in which some outlets were less confrontational towards the party. In recent years, broader worries about direct political interference in RAI have shifted the focus towards the current governing majority’s appointment practices, with FI playing a more secondary role compared to Fratelli d’Italia.

Berlusconi and other FI figures have frequently resorted to defamation suits to contest critical reporting, though these actions took place within Italy’s broader defamation‑law framework rather than through bespoke legal innovations. Today, Tajani presents FI as a moderate, institutional actor respectful of press freedom, and there is limited evidence of systematic harassment campaigns or state‑driven economic pressure on hostile outlets specifically attributable to the party, beyond the structural issues linked to MFE’s ownership and market power.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Medium	Benefits from a sympathetic commercial‑TV environment and infotainment framing, but not centred on a conspiratorial fringe‑media ecosystem; messaging largely within mainstream bounds.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Pro‑EU, pro‑NATO centre‑right party in the EPP family; occasional controversies around leaders’ rhetoric on Russia, but no evidence of structural dependence on authoritarian regimes or state‑aligned foreign media.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	High	Long‑standing overlap between FI’s political orbit and the Berlusconi‑controlled MFE media empire; structural concerns over private‑TV dominance persist even as RAI capture debates focus more on other governing parties.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	High	History of major corruption and organised‑crime‑related investigations around party figures; recent convictions (Pittelli, Comi) and regional probes (Toti) signal ongoing integrity vulnerabilities despite some acquittals.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	Medium–High	Structural concentration of media ownership and frequent recourse to defamation suits have raised long‑term concerns about pluralism and pressure on critical journalism, even within a still‑diverse media landscape.