Lega (Lega per Salvini Premier)
EU RANK: 169 (Tier 4: Low Performance)
Lega (Lega per Salvini Premier) is a right‑wing populist party that combines regionalist roots with a national law‑and‑order, anti‑immigration and Eurosceptic‑toned platform. In the 2022 general election it won 8.8% of the vote, a sharp decline from its earlier peak, and in the 2024 European Parliament election it obtained 9.0%, remaining a junior partner within the governing centre‑right coalition. Led by Matteo Salvini, who serves as deputy prime minister and transport minister, Lega has repositioned itself from northern autonomism towards a nationwide nationalist force, while in government moderating some of its earlier exit‑oriented rhetoric towards a more pragmatic, though still critical, stance on EU integration.
Disinformation and alternative media
Lega is strongly associated with highly professionalised social‑media campaigning, epitomised by the digital operation nicknamed “La Bestia” (“The Beast”), which synchronised high‑volume online posts, sentiment analysis and real‑time narrative framing. Academic and journalistic studies describe this infrastructure as a powerful agenda‑setting tool that amplified polarising messages on migration, security and identity, fuelling cycles in which online controversies generated TV coverage and vice versa. Although La Bestia’s original architect, Luca Morisi, resigned in 2021 following a personal legal probe, the communication model he designed has influenced subsequent digital strategies across Italian politics.
Despite this, Lega does not control a large proprietary ecosystem of fringe outlets comparable to some foreign far‑right media networks; instead, it leverages social platforms, sympathetic talk shows and regional broadcasters to circulate emotionally charged content that sometimes blurs into misleading or decontextualised narratives. Fact‑checking initiatives and media analyses have frequently highlighted problematic frames in Lega’s messaging on topics such as migration and EU policy, reinforcing concerns about its role in spreading polarising information even if not always outright fabrications.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Lega has historically expressed strong Euroscepticism and admiration for certain illiberal leaders, with earlier positions including calls for radical reconfiguration of European integration and warmer rhetoric towards Russia’s leadership. However, participation in government and the geopolitical shock of Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine have pushed the party towards a more constrained Atlanticist line, officially supporting sanctions and NATO commitments alongside its coalition partners. The party now frames its stance as defence of national sovereignty within the EU rather than outright exit, while maintaining critical rhetoric on migration policies, budget rules and Brussels’ perceived overreach.
Investigations and analyses of Russian influence in European politics have in the past drawn attention to Lega’s contacts and sympathies, yet there is no conclusive evidence of current structural dependence on or direction by authoritarian foreign regimes. In practice, Italy’s foreign policy under the Meloni government has remained anchored in the Euro‑Atlantic consensus, and Lega’s influence operates mainly through ideological signalling and domestic political framing rather than via documented operational ties with foreign state‑aligned media.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Lega does not own a major national media conglomerate, but it has been highly effective in leveraging tabloid television, regional broadcasters and its digital machine to shape the news agenda. Salvini’s media strategy has long combined ubiquitous talk‑show appearances with orchestrated social‑media campaigns, creating feedback loops where provocative online content forces coverage on mainstream TV. Within the current government, Lega participates in the broader centre‑right management of RAI, though FdI holds the most direct appointment power; concerns about public‑service broadcasting politicisation therefore implicate the coalition as a whole, with Lega playing a supportive rather than leading role.
On advertising and clientelism, Lega shares in the general Italian pattern of politicised allocation but is not associated with a single dominant commercial TV empire akin to Forza Italia’s MFE. Its structural media‑capture risk lies more in the continued use of aggressive agenda‑setting through digital‑TV synergies and participation in coalition‑driven influence over RAI governance than in ownership‑based control of private outlets.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Lega’s integrity profile is heavily shaped by the long‑running “49‑million” party‑funds affair, which concerned fraudulent use of public electoral reimbursements under earlier leadership. Between 2017 and 2019 courts convicted former leader Umberto Bossi and ex‑treasurer Francesco Belsito, ordered the seizure and gradual recovery of around €49 million from the party and had these orders upheld by the Court of Cassation, leaving Lega’s finances under prolonged judicial constraint. During Salvini’s tenure, the party has also faced high‑profile legal exposure over migration policy: he was prosecuted in the Gregoretti and Open Arms ship‑blockage cases, but the former was dismissed in 2021 and the latter ended with an acquittal at first instance in December 2024, now under appeal.
Regional governance figures linked to the broader Lega camp have likewise been scrutinised, though with mixed outcomes: Lombardy president Attilio Fontana was fully cleared in 2023 in the “camici” COVID‑supplies case, illustrating that not all investigations result in convictions. Taken together, these episodes point to significant historical vulnerabilities in Lega’s party‑finance practices and to the legal risks arising from its hardline approach to migration, even as recent verdicts have removed some immediate threats to Salvini personally.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media
Lega’s leadership frequently clashes with critical journalists, particularly over coverage of migration, security and corruption cases, often accusing outlets of left‑wing bias or “fake news”. This confrontational rhetoric contributes to a hostile climate for some reporters, although Italy’s media environment remains pluralistic and there is no evidence of systemic physical harassment campaigns directed by the party. Press‑freedom assessments and civil‑society reports, however, highlight that the combination of aggressive online trolling by supporters and the threat of defamation suits can have a chilling effect on especially outspoken critics.
Within government, Lega participates in coalition decisions affecting RAI and broader media policy, but its individual role in recent appointment controversies is less visible than that of FdI. The party has not championed reforms to strengthen protections against SLAPPs or to depoliticise public‑service media, focusing instead on security and migration issues, which leaves concerns that its approach may indirectly exacerbate pressures on independent journalism in an already fragile context.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Medium–High | Pioneered the “La Bestia” digital machine and aggressive social‑media agenda‑setting, often using polarising and sometimes misleading narratives, though without a large proprietary fringe‑media empire. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Medium | Historically Eurosceptic with controversial sympathies, now constrained by coalition‑level Atlanticism; no conclusive evidence of current structural dependence on authoritarian regimes, but past contacts and rhetoric keep concerns alive. |
| Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control | Medium | No major media ownership but strong digital‑TV synergy and participation in coalition influence over RAI; benefits from tabloid TV and regional broadcasters in a politicised media system. |
| Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk | High | Burdened by the “49‑million” party‑funds saga and ongoing financial recovery orders; additional high‑profile cases around Salvini’s migration policies and regional governance underscore persistent integrity vulnerabilities. |
| Press‑freedom & harassment of media | Medium–High | Combative rhetoric towards journalists and intense supporter trolling risk chilling critical coverage; participates in a coalition criticised for politicising RAI, while offering limited support for stronger press‑freedom safeguards. |