United List (Apvienotais saraksts, AS)
EU RANK: 89 (Tier 2: High Performance)
The United List (Apvienotais saraksts, AS) is a regionalist, green‑conservative and centrist alliance bringing together the Latvian Green Party, Latvian Association of Regions and the Liepāja Party, built around entrepreneur Uldis Pīlēns. In the 2022 Saeima election it won 15 seats (11.0% of the vote) and initially joined Krišjānis Kariņš’s government, before moving into opposition in 2023 when it declined to participate in Evika Siliņa’s new coalition. In the 2024 European Parliament election the United List obtained one seat, represented by MEP Reinis Pozņaks, confirming its continued relevance as a regionalist and centrist force despite limited organisational depth.
Disinformation and alternative media
The United List does not have a large, dedicated ecosystem of partisan alternative media and instead relies on regional outlets, local radio, national TV talk shows and standard social‑media campaigning. Pīlēns and other leading figures cultivate a strong personal presence in debates about regional development, energy and governance, gaining visibility through appearances on LTV, TV3 and digital portals rather than through conspiratorial or fringe platforms. Analyses of disinformation in Latvia focus more on Russian‑language pro‑Kremlin networks and overtly populist parties; AS is not identified as a key organiser of false‑information campaigns.
The alliance leverages the fragility of local media to amplify its regional message, benefitting from municipal and regional press that often reflects local political interests, but there is no clear evidence of United List‑run outlets systematically producing disinformation. Regulatory and watchdog reports on hybrid threats do not single out AS as an operator of coordinated inauthentic behaviour or as a conduit for foreign propaganda.
Foreign influence and external alignments
United List positions itself as pro‑European and supportive of NATO, while stressing national interests, regional development and pragmatic governance. Its leaders back Latvia’s strong stance on Russia, including sanctions and support for Ukraine, and present the alliance as a responsible, centre‑right or centrist actor rather than as a Eurosceptic challenger. At EU level, its MEP aligns with mainstream moderate forces, focusing on transport, regional cohesion and economic policy rather than on attempts to undermine European integration.
Country analyses of external influence and Kremlin‑aligned actors in Latvia focus on other parties and on specific pro‑Russia formations; there is no evidence that AS maintains structured ties with authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media that would compromise Latvia’s information integrity. Any foreign‑policy risk associated with the alliance stems from its potential coalition‑building role rather than from direct external alignments.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
AS does not control national‑level media conglomerates but benefits from strong roots in certain regions, where local press and municipal outlets can be closely intertwined with political and business elites. Research on Latvian media notes that thinly resourced regional newsrooms are particularly susceptible to influence via municipal advertising and PR, a pattern relevant to parties like the United List that foreground local governance. However, these dynamics reflect structural features of Latvian regional media rather than a documented, centralised capture strategy by AS itself.
In terms of financing, United List receives substantial state subsidies—about €700,000 in 2023 and €790,000 in 2024—under Latvia’s public‑funding formula, supplemented by donations disclosed through KNAB’s system. This provides significant resources for communication, but KNAB has not reported major sanctions against AS for misuse of public funds or campaign‑finance violations in 2015–2025, distinguishing it from parties like the National Alliance that have faced partial subsidy suspensions.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation over the last decade has centred on other parties, and available summaries explicitly note the absence of headline criminal judgments against the United List and its top leadership. The “oligarch conversations” leaks of 2017, which involved discussions among figures such as Aivars Lembergs, Ainārs Šlesers and Andris Šķēle about media influence and political deals, shaped public perceptions of old‑era elites, but AS as an alliance is a newer formation and has not been the subject of major corruption convictions. Some of its constituent parties and associated personalities come from environments historically linked to oligarchic politics, which creates reputational sensitivities, yet courts have not issued adverse criminal rulings against AS itself in 2015–2025.
United List thus operates within Latvia’s generally well‑regulated but imperfect party‑finance system, benefiting from generous public funding while being subject to KNAB oversight. OECD and GRECO reports highlight system‑wide enforcement gaps and the need for stronger auditing capacity, meaning that integrity risks are more structural than party‑specific, though AS’s regional networks will remain a focus for watchdogs if large‑scale patronage or procurement controversies emerge.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media
AS engages with a broad range of outlets, including public‑service media, national commercial TV and regional press, without being identified as a major source of pressure on journalists. Its rhetoric focuses on governance quality, regional fairness and scepticism toward entrenched elites rather than on direct attacks against the press, and there is little evidence of systematic defamation suits or economic reprisals against critical media orchestrated by the alliance.
Press‑freedom assessments of Latvia note structural vulnerabilities, such as regional media dependence on municipal advertising and concerns over regulatory independence, but do not single out the United List as a driver of negative trends. To date, the party’s interaction with media has followed standard patterns of criticism and debate rather than escalating into harassment or legal intimidation, suggesting a relatively low direct risk profile for press freedom, even if the broader environment remains delicate at regional level.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low–Medium | Relies on regional outlets and standard digital campaigning; not linked to a structured conspiratorial ecosystem, though operates in a fragile local‑media environment where messaging can dominate. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro‑EU, pro‑NATO centrist alliance; supports sanctions on Russia and mainstream Euro‑Atlantic policies, with no evidence of structured ties to authoritarian regimes or state‑aligned foreign media. |
| Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control | Medium | No national media ownership but benefits from regional networks in a context where local outlets are vulnerable to municipal advertising influence; depends on earned media and public subsidies rather than overt capture. |
| Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk | Low–Medium | No major corruption convictions or adverse criminal rulings against the alliance; some leaders have oligarch‑era backgrounds, but current oversight and public‑funding rules mitigate immediate risks. |
| Press‑freedom & harassment of media | Low | Engages robustly with national and regional media without documented patterns of legal or economic harassment; systemic regional‑media fragility remains a contextual concern rather than a party‑specific strategy. |