Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Tėvynės sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai, TS‑LKD)

EU RANK: 39 (Tier 2: High Performance)

Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS‑LKD) is a centre‑right, liberal‑conservative party that combines Christian‑democratic social values with strong pro‑European and pro‑NATO positions. After leading governments through much of the 2016–2024 period, TS‑LKD moved into opposition following the 2024 Seimas election, in which it won 28 seats and ceded power to a centre‑left coalition led by the Social Democrats. Laurynas Kasčiūnas was elected party chair in February 2025, and under his leadership TS‑LKD acts as the main opposition force, stressing national security, support for Ukraine and fiscal responsibility.​

Disinformation and alternative media

TS‑LKD communicates primarily through mainstream media, public broadcaster LRT, major commercial TV channels and leading news portals, as well as professionalised social‑media operations focused on security, rule of law and economic policy. Party leaders have been among the most vocal advocates of robust counter‑disinformation measures, supporting platforms like Debunk.org and Demaskuok and emphasising coordinated responses to Russian information operations. Mapping of Lithuanian disinformation ecosystems highlights pro‑Kremlin sources and nationalist outlets such as Respublika, not TS‑LKD, as major propagators of false narratives.

The party’s digital campaigning emphasises factual messaging about defence, EU affairs and domestic reforms rather than conspiratorial content. Regulatory and watchdog reports on hybrid threats describe TS‑LKD as part of the political camp that pushed for tougher regulation of hostile‑state media and online propaganda, rather than as an organiser of coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

Foreign influence and external alignments

TS‑LKD is firmly anchored in the pro‑EU and pro‑NATO mainstream, advocating deeper European integration, strong support for Ukraine and a leading Lithuanian role in regional security initiatives. The party is part of the European People’s Party family and supports sanctions against Russia, enhanced defence spending and closer cooperation with Baltic and Nordic partners. Its foreign‑policy stance emphasises rule of law, transatlantic ties and resistance to authoritarian influence, and party elites often frame Lithuania as a frontline democracy in the struggle against Kremlin aggression.

Analyses of malign foreign influence in Lithuania do not identify TS‑LKD as a conduit for external actors; rather, it is frequently cited as a driver of legal and regulatory initiatives to block Russian propaganda and strengthen resilience. There is no evidence of structured financial or media ties between TS‑LKD and authoritarian regimes or their state‑aligned outlets.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Lithuanian law prohibits political parties from owning media outlets directly, and TS‑LKD has no documented ownership stakes in major national media. Its influence over the information space has been exerted mainly through legislative and oversight roles rather than through corporate control: during debates over scrutiny of public broadcaster LRT, TS‑LKD generally resisted efforts seen as attempts to politicise audits and defended the broadcaster’s editorial independence. In 2025, when the Seimas voted to ask the National Audit Office to review LRT, conservatives and liberal parties abstained or opposed, signalling their unease with renewed political pressure.​

TS‑LKD is one of the main beneficiaries of state subsidies, receiving about €1.56 million in 2024, making it the largest single recipient of public party funding. This money supports professional communication and campaign activities but is allocated by a formula based on votes and is subject to disclosure and auditing rules enforced by the Central Electoral Commission. There is no record of major sanctions against TS‑LKD over misuse of subsidies or campaign‑finance violations in 2015–2025, distinguishing it from parties convicted in the MG Baltic case.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation surveys for 2015–2025 report no criminal convictions against TS‑LKD as a party. While individual political figures associated with the broader centre‑right have at times faced administrative or older corruption allegations, the party entity itself has not been found guilty of graft or illegal financing in the period under review. Lithuania’s headline corruption cases in recent years—the MG Baltic/MG Grup affair and the Order and Justice conviction—implicated other parties such as the Liberal Movement and Labour Party, not TS‑LKD.

International governance assessments by Freedom House and the Bertelsmann BTI note that TS‑LKD governments contributed to strengthening integrity frameworks, including campaign‑finance reforms and anti‑corruption institutions, even as broader systemic challenges remain. The main integrity risks for TS‑LKD are therefore systemic rather than party‑specific, linked to Lithuania’s concentrated media market and limited enforcement capacity, but the absence of party‑level convictions places it at the lower end of corruption risk among major formations.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media

TS‑LKD publicly supports high press‑freedom standards and has often aligned with civil‑society organisations and journalists in resisting attempts to politicise LRT or to use audits as tools of pressure. Press‑freedom actors note that the party’s stance has been important in blocking initiatives from other parties—such as the Farmers Greens Union—to expand parliamentary inquiries into the public broadcaster’s management in ways seen as threatening editorial independence.

There is no evidence that TS‑LKD systematically uses defamation suits, regulatory levers or advertising boycotts to intimidate critical outlets; political conflicts with media generally occur within standard democratic contestation and public debate. International rankings place Lithuania among the freest media environments globally, and analyses attribute remaining concerns to ownership concentration and municipal‑level dependencies rather than to targeted harassment by TS‑LKD.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Low	Relies on mainstream and party channels; active in counter‑disinformation efforts, with no evidence of organised conspiratorial or misleading alternative‑media networks.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Strongly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO, aligned with the EPP; champions sanctions and support for Ukraine, with no documented ties to authoritarian regimes or state‑aligned foreign media.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	Low–Medium	Holds significant agenda‑setting power and large public subsidies but no media ownership; has generally defended LRT independence rather than pursuing capture, though operates within a concentrated media market.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	Low	No party‑level criminal convictions in 2015–2025; integrity risks are systemic rather than specific, compared with parties convicted in the MG Baltic and Order and Justice cases.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	Low	Positions itself as an ally of independent media and public broadcasting; not associated with systematic legal or economic harassment of journalists or outlets.