Union of Democrats “For Lithuania” (Demokratų sąjunga „Vardan Lietuvos“, DSVL)
EU RANK: 96 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)
The Union of Democrats “For Lithuania” (DSVL) is a green‑conservative, social‑democratic party formed as a breakaway from the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union, combining moderate environmentalism, state‑active economic policy and socially cautious positions. Led by former prime minister Saulius Skvernelis, it won 14 seats (around 9.2%) in the 2024 Seimas election and joined the governing coalition, holding senior posts—including the speakership of the Seimas until Skvernelis stepped down in September 2025 amid a broader reshuffle. DSVL presents itself as a pragmatic alternative to both traditional conservatives and older agrarian structures, with a focus on regional development and welfare‑friendly but fiscally cautious policies.
Disinformation and alternative media
DSVL relies on mainstream media and regional outlets rather than on a dense network of partisan alternative channels. Skvernelis and other leaders appear frequently on LRT, commercial TV and major portals, where they frame the party as a responsible centrist force seeking to bridge urban‑rural divides, and they use social media in a conventional campaigning style to promote policy proposals on energy, regional development and welfare. Mappings of Lithuanian disinformation ecosystems focus instead on Kremlin‑aligned sources and nationalist platforms; DSVL is not identified as a major propagator of conspiratorial narratives.
The party generally supports cross‑party efforts to counter Russian information operations and backs regulatory measures against hostile‑state broadcasters, though it sometimes emphasises the need to balance security with media pluralism and regional information needs. There is no evidence of coordinated inauthentic behaviour or systematic use of fringe outlets by DSVL to spread false narratives.
Foreign influence and external alignments
DSVL is pro‑EU and pro‑NATO, supporting Lithuania’s Euro‑Atlantic orientation while arguing for more attention to social cohesion and regional equity within European frameworks. It backs sanctions against Russia and assistance to Ukraine, and Skvernelis has consistently presented the party as committed to national security and alliance obligations, even when criticising elements of government implementation. At the European level, DSVL has sought pragmatic cooperation with centrist and green‑conservative forces, focusing on energy security, cohesion policy and rural development rather than on Eurosceptic realignment.
Analyses of foreign influence in Lithuania concentrate on Kremlin‑aligned media, certain minority parties and historic oligarchic networks; DSVL does not appear in these assessments as a conduit for authoritarian regimes or state‑aligned foreign media. External‑influence risks for the party are therefore judged low and primarily systemic.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
DSVL does not own major media outlets and operates under Lithuania’s prohibition on party media ownership. Its influence derives from government participation and from Skvernelis’ visibility as a former prime minister and Seimas speaker, which secure coverage on national and regional platforms. The party has not been central to high‑profile attempts to exert pressure on LRT; debates about PSM oversight and audits have mainly involved the Farmers Greens Union and, to a lesser extent, other parties.
On financing, DSVL receives state subsidies under a special rule for new parties with a Seimas faction, amounting to roughly €350,000 across 2023–2024, with about €174,000 of that in 2024 half‑year transfers. These public funds, supplemented by individual donations under Lithuania’s capped and disclosed regime, provide the bulk of the party’s communication budget, and there is no record of VRK sanctions against DSVL for misuse of subsidies or campaign‑finance violations in 2015–2025.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation over 2015–2025 reports no party‑level criminal convictions against the Union of Democrats or its top leadership. Skvernelis’ earlier tenure as prime minister was controversial in policy terms but did not produce major personal corruption convictions, and the Farmers Greens Union, not DSVL, was the focus of scrutiny over inquiries into LRT and questions about agribusiness interests. As a newer formation, DSVL’s integrity risks are more forward‑looking, centred on how it manages public funding, appointments and procurement while in government.
International integrity assessments highlight Lithuania’s relatively strong anti‑corruption framework and the deterrent effect of high‑profile convictions in other parties (MG Baltic, Order and Justice), but they also warn of limited auditing capacity and ongoing vulnerabilities around public procurement and regional patronage. DSVL, with its regionalist and welfare focus, operates within this environment; the absence of current convictions keeps its formal risk moderate, but maintaining clean governance as a coalition partner will be central to its future profile.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media
DSVL publicly supports press freedom and has not been associated with systematic attempts to intimidate journalists or interfere with LRT’s editorial independence. Its leaders appear regularly in interviews and debates on LRT and other outlets, often emphasising dialogue and policy explanation rather than attacks on the media, though they, like other politicians, occasionally criticise coverage as biased or incomplete. Press‑freedom rankings place Lithuania high internationally and do not single out DSVL as a source of harassment or abusive litigation against journalists.
The party’s main press‑freedom risk stems from its role in government decision‑making: choices about regulatory appointments, public advertising and local‑media support can affect editorial independence, especially in regions where outlets depend heavily on municipal contracts. To date, however, there is no evidence that DSVL has used these levers in a systematic way to punish or reward specific outlets, keeping its direct risk profile relatively moderate.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low–Medium | Relies on mainstream and regional media plus standard social‑media campaigning; not linked to structured conspiratorial networks, though operates in a fragmented local‑media environment. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro‑EU, pro‑NATO, supports sanctions and aid to Ukraine; no evidence of structured ties to authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media. |
| Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control | Low–Medium | No media ownership and limited subsidy share; influence comes via incumbency and regional networks rather than overt capture, with no major LRT‑pressure episodes tied to the party. |
| Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk | Medium | No party‑level convictions, but operates in a system with known vulnerabilities; as a new governing force, faces ongoing scrutiny over how it manages public funds and appointments. |
| Press‑freedom & harassment of media | Low–Medium | Engages normally with journalists and supports overall press freedom; no evidence of systematic harassment, though regional media dependence on public contracts remains a contextual risk. |