Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW – “Reason & Justice”)

EU RANK: 166 (Tier 4: Low Performance)

BSW is a left‑economic, socially conservative and migration‑sceptical party founded by Sahra Wagenknecht after her split from Die Linke, combining welfare‑state protection with strong criticism of sanctions on Russia, arms deliveries to Ukraine and liberal migration policy. In the 2025 federal election it won around 4.9% of the vote, just below the 5% threshold, and therefore failed to enter the Bundestag, though it has since built regional strength in eastern Länder. The party positions itself as an anti‑establishment alternative to both neoliberal centrism and right‑wing populism.​

Disinformation and alternative media

BSW makes intensive use of social media, YouTube formats and appearances in talk shows, and is amplified by a growing ecosystem of sympathetic online outlets and influencers that cater to audiences sceptical of mainstream media and government narratives. Monitoring of German disinformation debates highlights that content aligned with BSW’s positions on Ukraine, NATO and sanctions often overlaps with Kremlin talking points and circulates widely in alternative‑media networks, even if not always formally coordinated by the party itself. Wagenknecht’s own platforms have repeatedly been criticised by fact‑checkers for selective or misleading framings around war, migration and energy policy. Disinformation/alternative media DMI risk is high.

Foreign influence and external alignments

BSW frames itself as a defender of peace and social interests, but adopts strongly critical positions on NATO, arms deliveries and sanctions, calling for a negotiated settlement with Russia and denouncing what it presents as Western escalation. Open sources do not document direct financial control by the Russian state or other hostile governments, yet the party’s messaging is frequently praised and echoed by Russian state media and pro‑Kremlin channels, raising concern about its susceptibility as a vector for foreign influence narratives. Its economic programme is domestically focused, but foreign‑policy stances place it at odds with Germany’s mainstream cross‑party consensus on Ukraine and Russia. Foreign influence DMI risk is high.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

As a new party without federal government participation, BSW has no structural leverage over ARD/ZDF governance or state advertising flows and does not own major media outlets. Its media strategy relies instead on high‑visibility personal brands (particularly Wagenknecht) and on alternative or YouTube‑style channels, some of which are formally independent but strongly aligned with its narratives. There is no evidence of attempts to capture public‑service broadcasters, although the party frequently accuses them of bias and calls for significant reforms. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is low to moderate (coded as moderate due to the growing alt‑media ecosystem around it).

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Because BSW was only founded shortly before the 2025 election, there is limited litigation history; no major corruption or procurement scandals centred on the party or its top leadership have been reported to date. Funding appears to come from public subsidies linked to its vote share, membership dues and donations under Germany’s standard party‑finance system, with the same disclosure and oversight requirements that apply to other parties. Some experts, however, flag the need for closer scrutiny if the party expands rapidly, given its personalised structure and reliance on a small leadership circle. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is low.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

BSW leaders, especially Wagenknecht, strongly criticise mainstream media as biased on Ukraine, Russia and pandemic policy, but they have not so far engaged in systematic harassment campaigns or attempted to delegitimise journalism as “enemy of the people” in the style of AfD. The party’s rhetoric contributes to audience distrust in established outlets and channels supporters toward alternative platforms, yet open reports do not show patterns of orchestrated online mobs or SLAPP‑type lawsuits against critical journalists. BSW also supports civil‑liberties positions on surveillance and emergency laws, which partially align with press‑freedom groups. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is moderate.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	High	Strong presence in alternative and social‑media ecosystems; messaging on Ukraine, NATO and sanctions often overlaps with Kremlin narratives and has drawn fact‑checker criticism.
Foreign influence & external alignments	High	No proven hostile‑state funding, but consistently opposes sanctions and arms for Ukraine and is amplified by Russian state media, raising vulnerability to foreign influence.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Moderate	No structural PSB control but growing reliance on aligned alternative channels that act as de facto media sphere for supporters.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	Low	New party with no major corruption cases; operates under Germany’s party‑finance rules, though long‑term integrity remains to be tested.
Press freedom & harassment of media	Moderate	Harshly critical of mainstream media and encourages distrust but no clear pattern of organised harassment or legal intimidation of journalists.