Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich‑Soziale Union (CDU/CSU)§1

EU RANK: 30 (Tier 2: High Performance)

CDU/CSU is a centre‑right, Christian‑democratic bloc combining economic liberalism with conservative social values and strong support for EU and NATO integration. After winning about 28.5% of the vote and 208 seats in the February 2025 federal election, the bloc formed a grand coalition with the SPD, and CDU leader Friedrich Merz was elected Chancellor in May 2025. The Union now leads the federal government and shapes fiscal, security and migration policy.​

Disinformation and alternative media

CDU/CSU communication runs primarily through mainstream broadcasters, regional press, party outlets and social media, without control over large alternative‑media ecosystems. Research on Germany’s disinformation sphere finds that while individual conservative influencers close to the Union sometimes share polarising narratives, there is no evidence of a centrally directed party disinformation machine comparable to far‑right networks; the bloc itself is also targeted by extremist and pro‑Kremlin campaigns, especially around Ukraine and migration. Official party structures emphasise message discipline and rely on professionalised campaign consultancies. Disinformation/alternative media DMI risk is low.

Foreign influence and external alignments

The Union is firmly pro‑EU and Atlanticist, backing NATO burden‑sharing, strong support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, and a tougher line on China in strategic sectors. Litigation and investigation over 2015–2025 reveal no systemic financial dependence on hostile foreign states, though some past donation controversies (e.g. around opaque business donors) prompted tighter internal compliance rules. CDU/CSU foreign‑policy elites are embedded in mainstream transatlantic and European party networks. Foreign influence DMI risk is low.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Historically close to parts of the regional press and private broadcasting sector, CDU/CSU today does not own major media companies but benefits from dense informal ties in some Länder. Research on 2015–2025 shows that when in government at federal and state level, the Union has significant influence over appointments to ARD/ZDF supervisory bodies and over distribution of state advertising, yet these practices mostly follow formal corporatist rules rather than overt capture attempts. The party officially supports independent public‑service media but often pushes for “balance” and cost controls, creating some pressure but not full‑scale politicisation. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Court records and investigations list several notable CDU/CSU‑related finance scandals since 2015—from legacy slush‑fund issues to more recent lobbying and mask‑procurement cases—but these have involved specific politicians and networks rather than a single, ongoing central party scheme. Funding analysis shows the bloc relies on a mix of public subsidies, membership dues and substantial corporate‑linked donations, with improved internal compliance and transparency arrangements after previous scandals. Overall, integrity concerns are higher than for Greens or SPD but still contained within the democratic framework. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is moderate.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

CDU/CSU generally respects media freedom and works within Germany’s constitutional protections for journalists and broadcasters. Some leading figures criticise public and liberal media for perceived bias and support reforms to tighten PSB mandates, but there is no pattern of systematic harassment, legal intimidation or smear campaigns comparable to far‑right actors. The bloc endorses initiatives against online hate targeting reporters while defending strong protections for investigative journalism. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is low to moderate (coded as low).

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Low	Relies on mainstream and party channels; no centrally run disinformation ecosystem; also a target of extremist/pro‑Kremlin campaigns.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Strongly pro‑EU/NATO and pro‑Ukraine; no systemic hostile‑state funding, though past donation controversies tightened compliance.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Moderate	Significant influence over PSB boards and state advertising where in power; practices largely rules‑based but create some structural leverage over media.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	Moderate	Repeated individual finance and lobbying scandals, yet no single ongoing central scheme; strengthened internal transparency measures.
Press freedom & harassment of media	Low	Operates within constitutional safeguards; sometimes criticises perceived bias but no systematic harassment or punitive campaigns against journalists.