Eesti Keskerakond (Centre Party)

EU RANK: 130 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)

Eesti Keskerakond is a centrist to centre‑left, populist and social‑liberal party that historically served as a catch‑all vehicle for urban working‑class voters and Estonia’s Russian‑speaking minority. Founded and long dominated by Edgar Savisaar, it has combined welfare‑state expansion and redistributive policies with pragmatic, sometimes ambiguous positions on relations with Russia, which have been a recurring source of political controversy. Under current leader Mihhail Kõlvart, the party suffered a major setback in the 2023 election (15.3% and 16 seats) but remains influential in Tallinn and local government.​

Disinformation and alternative media

The Centre Party uses mainstream television, Russian‑language media, and social‑media channels to reach its electorate, without owning large alternative media outlets of its own. Research indicates that some narratives attractive to its Russian‑speaking base—particularly before 2014—were amplified by Kremlin‑aligned channels, but there is limited evidence of centrally coordinated disinformation campaigns originating from the party apparatus itself. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the party has tried to distance itself from overtly pro‑Kremlin messaging, though it remains vulnerable to disinformation targeting its voters. Disinformation/alternative media risk is moderate.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Historically, Keskerakond’s leadership maintained warmer rhetoric toward Moscow than other major parties, and Savisaar faced criticism over contacts and cooperation agreements with the Russian ruling party, which raised concerns about susceptibility to Kremlin influence. While the party now formally supports Estonia’s EU and NATO orientation and backs aid to Ukraine, its reliance on Russian‑speaking voters and this legacy continue to pose reputational and structural risks. No recent evidence points to direct financial control by hostile foreign states, but past links and perceived softness on Russia justify an elevated DMI rating. Foreign influence DMI risk is moderate.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

The Centre Party does not own major national media houses, but its long‑term control of Tallinn’s municipal government has provided leverage over local advertising, city‑owned outlets and information channels. Studies of Tallinn governance point to politicised communication practices, including favourable coverage on city platforms and disputes over the neutrality of Russian‑language municipal media, though these have not translated into full‑scale national media capture. At the national level, its role in ERR governance has followed formal rules, but the party’s local‑level communication model increases concern about indirect capture tendencies. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation records from 2015–2025 show several major corruption and influence‑peddling cases associated with the Centre Party, including scandals around Tallinn city contracts and the 2021 Porto Franco real‑estate case that led to Prime Minister Jüri Ratas’s resignation. Even when individual leaders avoided conviction, repeated investigations and plea bargains damaged the party’s integrity profile and highlighted vulnerabilities in party‑finance and municipal procurement practices. Although the party now operates under the same tightened transparency and reporting requirements as others, its recent history justifies a higher institutional‑integrity risk rating. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is high (upper‑moderate).

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

At the national level, Keskerakond generally accepts independent media scrutiny, but in Tallinn its dominance has occasionally produced tense relations with critical outlets and questions about access and advertising pressure. Party figures have sometimes accused national media of bias against Russian‑speaking communities, yet there is no robust evidence of systematic harassment campaigns or widespread use of vexatious litigation against journalists. Overall, the party operates within democratic norms, but its track record in municipal communication and corruption‑related cases warrants a cautious assessment. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is moderate.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Moderate	Relies on mainstream and Russian‑language media; some narratives historically amplified by Kremlin‑aligned outlets; no clear centrally run disinfo network but elevated risk.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Moderate	Formally pro‑EU/NATO but legacy of warmer ties to Moscow and cooperation agreements raises vulnerability and reputational risk.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Moderate	No national media ownership, but long‑term control of Tallinn gives leverage over municipal media and advertising, raising partial‑capture concerns.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	High	Repeated major corruption and procurement scandals, notably Porto Franco and Tallinn‑related cases, undermining integrity perception.
Press freedom & harassment of media	Moderate	Generally respects national media but local‑level dominance in Tallinn linked to pressure and uneven access for critical outlets.