Fine Gael (FG)

EU RANK: 107 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)

Fine Gael is a liberal‑conservative, Christian‑democratic and pro‑EU party that has alternated in government with Fianna Fáil and remains one of Ireland’s two main centre‑right forces. Under Simon Harris, who became Taoiseach in April 2024 and then Tánaiste in the FF–FG–independents coalition formed in January 2025, the party presents itself as a modernising, fiscally responsible force with strong Atlanticist credentials. In the 2024 general election Fine Gael won 38 seats, remained a core governing party, and retained substantial local and European representation, confirming its central role in Ireland’s party system.​

Disinformation and alternative media

Fine Gael relies on mainstream broadcasters, established newspapers and increasingly sophisticated digital campaigns rather than on a separate ecosystem of alternative “news” portals. The party has a reputation for disciplined government communication, exemplified by the now‑defunct Strategic Communications Unit (SCU), which used paid advertorials around “Project Ireland 2040” and was wound down in 2018 after criticism that government information and party promotion had been blurred. FG significantly ramped up online advertising around the 2024 general election, with notable late‑campaign ad bursts on major platforms, but available research and regulatory scrutiny focus on spending transparency rather than on the spread of demonstrably false narratives. Ireland’s media‑monitoring and regulatory frameworks—Coimisiún na Meán and the Electoral Commission—have not identified Fine Gael as a central organiser of disinformation networks in 2015–2025. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is low.​

Foreign influence and external alignments

Fine Gael is strongly pro‑EU, closely aligned with the European People’s Party, and firmly Atlanticist, supporting EU sanctions on Russia and deep cooperation with NATO partners while maintaining Ireland’s formal military neutrality. Its finances, like those of other major Irish parties, are dominated by exchequer funding allocated under the Electoral Act; between 2021 and 2024 FG received around 1.35–1.56 million euro per year in state subsidies, broadly comparable to Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin. Private donations are subject to strict caps, disclosure thresholds and a ban on foreign public‑source donations, and SIPO data do not show large, opaque foreign income streams directed at Fine Gael. No credible cases in 2015–2025 suggest operational control or financing by hostile states, and FG’s external alignments remain squarely within mainstream EU and transatlantic party families. Foreign‑influence and external‑alignment DMI risk is low.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Fine Gael has had substantial influence over communications policy and public‑service media during years in office, but it does not own major outlets and operates in a media market increasingly controlled by European groups such as Mediahuis and Bauer rather than domestic party‑linked proprietors. The SCU episode highlighted FG’s willingness to use centrally coordinated, paid government messaging across media, prompting criticism in parliament and the eventual dismantling of the unit as transparency and neutrality concerns mounted. In the wake of RTÉ’s 2023 payments scandal, Fine Gael backed reforms that kept the licence‑fee model while adding Exchequer support and governance changes, arguing that full tax funding could jeopardise editorial independence by tightening day‑to‑day fiscal control. While FG, as a governing party, helps shape RTÉ’s funding and regulation, investigative coverage and critical commentary from RTÉ, the Irish Times group and others show that the party has not secured a reliably loyal public‑broadcasting environment. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate.​

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Fine Gael has faced several high‑profile ethics and standards controversies over the past decade, though relatively few resulted in criminal prosecutions. Leo Varadkar’s disclosure of a draft GP contract to a rival medical organisation led to a prolonged ethics dispute: after media revelations and political pressure, the DPP declined to pursue criminal charges in 2022, and SIPO ultimately decided in 2024, following a High Court‑mandated reconsideration, that it would not open a formal investigation, finding no ulterior motive, though the episode highlighted grey zones in ethics oversight. Other FG cases include Paschal Donohoe’s acknowledged election‑expenses reporting breaches, corrected without prosecution, and Damien English’s 2023 resignation as Minister of State after admitting misleading information in a historic planning application, again with no criminal case attached. Fine Gael also carried reputational costs from non‑criminal controversies such as the “swing” personal‑injury claim by Maria Bailey, which was withdrawn amid public criticism and internal review. Overall, the pattern is one of recurring ethics and standards disputes, mitigated by resignations, corrections and administrative decisions rather than grand‑corruption prosecutions. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is moderate.​

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

Fine Gael operates in a media environment that is broadly free but shaped by defamation risks and economic pressures; as a governing party it is a frequent target of scrutiny and criticism from RTÉ, the Irish Times, the Irish Independent titles and newer investigative outlets. The SCU controversy, RTÉ’s governance crisis and disputes over political communication have been driven in part by watchdog reporting and parliamentary oversight rather than by attempts to silence journalists. FG figures have occasionally criticised coverage but the party is not associated with a pattern of SLAPP‑type lawsuits or targeted legal harassment of media; major defamation flashpoints in this period are more closely linked to Sinn Féin and individual litigants than to Fine Gael as an institution. FG’s stance in debates on RTÉ funding and defamation reform has generally framed media independence as important, even as it seeks to protect itself from perceived bias and reputational damage. Press‑freedom and harassment‑of‑media DMI risk is low.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Low	Uses mainstream media and structured digital ads; SCU episode showed aggressive government PR but no evidence of systematic disinformation networks.​
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Pro‑EU, Atlanticist, aligned with EPP; funding dominated by regulated public subsidies and capped domestic donations with no substantiated hostile‑state financing.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Moderate	Long governing role and central input into RTÉ reforms and communication policy; SCU controversy shows boundary‑pushing use of state communication but no durable captured media bloc.​
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	Moderate	Multiple ethics and standards controversies (Varadkar GP contract leak, Donohoe expenses, English planning issue, Bailey case) resolved through resignations or administrative findings rather than criminal convictions.​
Press freedom & harassment of media	Low	Governing party under regular investigative scrutiny; not associated with systematic SLAPP‑style suits or intimidation of journalists despite disputes over coverage.