Fratelli d’Italia (FdI)

EU RANK: 157 (Tier 4: Low Performance)

Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) is a national‑conservative, right‑wing populist party with post‑fascist roots that has been mainstreamed under Giorgia Meloni’s leadership. It won 26.0% of the vote in the 2022 general election, becoming Italy’s largest party, and 28.8% in the 2024 European Parliament election, consolidating its position at the top of the party system. Since October 2022 FdI has led a centre‑right coalition government with Lega and Forza Italia, with Meloni serving as prime minister and pursuing a sovereigntist, socially conservative agenda while broadly aligning foreign policy with the EU and NATO.​

Disinformation and alternative media

FdI rose to power primarily through conventional campaigning, strong television visibility and intensive social‑media use, rather than through a tightly organised ecosystem of FdI‑branded fringe outlets producing conspiratorial content. Its messaging has featured sharp rhetoric on migration, identity and “globalist” elites, but investigations of Italian disinformation ecosystems focus more on far‑right online networks, anti‑vaccine pages and individual influencers than on a formal party‑run disinformation apparatus. Available research does not document a stable FdI‑centred network comparable, for example, to Lega’s “La Bestia” operation or to foreign far‑right media hubs that systematically push false narratives.​

Within government, FdI’s communication strategy combines programmatic positioning, culture‑war themes and personalistic branding around Meloni across mainstream TV, print and social platforms. The party has been accused by critics of amplifying misleading frames on migration and LGBT rights, yet major fact‑checking and regulatory interventions in Italy have more often targeted specific statements or broadcasters than any centrally coordinated campaign attributable to FdI as an organisation.

Foreign influence and external alignments

FdI combines elements of Euroscepticism and sovereigntism with an Atlanticist foreign‑policy line that keeps Italy anchored in NATO and the EU’s core positions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the European level it sits within the national‑conservative and far‑right family but, in government, Meloni has worked to reassure partners by supporting sanctions on Russia and maintaining commitments to EU fiscal and security frameworks. Analyses of external influence in Italian politics highlight historical links between parts of the right and actors in Russia or Hungary, but they do not present evidence that FdI is structurally dependent on, or directed by, authoritarian foreign regimes.​

The party’s foreign alignments instead centre on ideological proximity to other European radical‑right forces and on efforts to reshape EU institutions towards a looser, more intergovernmental model, rather than on explicit realignment away from the West. In information‑integrity terms, FdI operates as a domestically driven actor whose international alliances are visible and formalised, rather than covert.​​

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Since taking office in 2022, FdI has exercised significant influence over RAI, Italy’s public broadcaster, through appointments and governance changes that triggered concern among journalists’ unions, European institutions and press‑freedom NGOs. The resignation of RAI CEO Carlo Fuortes in 2023, followed by the appointment of Roberto Sergio and Giampaolo Rossi to top roles, was widely interpreted as a politically driven reshuffle aligned with the governing majority. High‑profile presenters such as Fabio Fazio left RAI amid complaints of political pressure, and a journalists’ strike in May 2024 highlighted fears of “suffocating control” over editorial choices.​

These developments fit into a longer Italian tradition of lottizzazione, in which parties share control of public broadcasting, but observers emphasise that FdI’s approach has intensified concerns about partisan capture and the use of cultural institutions to promote a nationalist narrative. Unlike Forza Italia, FdI does not own a private TV empire; instead, its leverage comes from government control over RAI appointments and agenda‑setting, supported by sympathetic segments of commercial TV and talk shows. Regulatory oversight by AGCOM and EU rule‑of‑law monitoring provide some counter‑weight but have not removed perceptions of rising executive influence over public media.​

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

FdI as a party is not yet associated with long‑running systemic corruption scandals comparable to those that have affected older formations such as Lega or Forza Italia, but governing has brought legal scrutiny of individual office‑holders. Undersecretary of Justice Andrea Delmastro, an FdI figure, was convicted at first instance in May 2025 for unlawful disclosure of official secrets in the “Cospito dossier” affair; the judgment is appealable but has raised questions about management of sensitive information within the ruling party. Tourism Minister Daniela Santanchè, also linked to FdI, has been ordered to stand trial in Milan over alleged false accounting and related corporate issues involving her former publishing group Visibilia, with proceedings ongoing.​

These cases contribute to a narrative of ethics challenges for the Meloni cabinet, even if they do not yet amount to a structurally corrupt party‑finance scheme. Italy’s broader institutional context, marked by historic concerns over patronage, public‑contracts management and the influence of regional political machines, means that FdI operates within a high‑risk environment in which judicial investigations can quickly acquire systemic significance. The party has publicly backed anti‑corruption rhetoric and law‑and‑order policies, but its long‑term integrity profile will depend on how it handles these and any future cases involving its cadres.​

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media

Press‑freedom assessments of Italy since 2022 point to increased pressure on journalists and public media linked to the governing majority’s approach to criticism and defamation law. Meloni and other FdI figures have filed or threatened multiple defamation suits, including actions against writers and commentators who used strongly pejorative language to describe the prime minister’s political background, although some cases have later been dropped or partially resolved. International watchdogs argue that such litigation, even when formally lawful, can have a chilling effect on critical commentary and contribute to a climate of self‑censorship.

At the same time, Italy retains a pluralistic private media environment with critical newspapers, TV channels and online outlets that regularly scrutinise FdI and the government. The party often denounces unfavourable coverage as biased or “left‑wing”, but there is no evidence of systematic physical harassment of journalists or of legal measures directly criminalising criticism. The main DMI concern lies in the combination of politicised RAI governance, strategic use of defamation suits by senior figures and polarising rhetoric, which together increase risks to editorial independence even without overt censorship.​

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Medium	Relies on mainstream TV and social media; no evidence of a tightly organised conspiratorial outlet network, but recurrent use of polarising frames and contested narratives on migration and identity.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low–Medium	National‑conservative, EU‑sceptical rhetoric yet Atlanticist in practice; aligned with European radical‑right parties but no documented structural dependence on authoritarian regimes or state‑aligned foreign media.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	Medium–High	Exercises substantial appointment power over RAI and cultural institutions; reshuffles and high‑profile departures have triggered domestic and EU concerns about politicisation of public service media.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	Medium	Not yet tied to large‑scale historic funding scandals, but individual ministers face criminal proceedings and convictions at first instance, highlighting governance‑integrity vulnerabilities in office.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	Medium	Pluralistic media environment remains, yet RAI governance disputes and the governing camp’s resort to defamation suits against critics raise the risk of chilled journalism and indirect pressure on critical voices.