Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)
EU RANK: 177 (Tier 5: High Risk)
The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is a far‑right, national‑conservative and Eurosceptic party led by Herbert Kickl since 2021. In the 2024 National Council election it won 28.8% of the vote and 57 seats, becoming the largest party and achieving the best far‑right result in Austria since 1945. Despite this, the FPÖ remained in opposition after the ÖVP, SPÖ and NEOS formed a three‑party coalition that explicitly excluded it.
Disinformation and alternative media
FPÖ’s communication is strongly supported by a parallel media ecosystem consisting of party‑run and ideologically aligned outlets. Since 2012, the party has operated FPÖ‑TV, an internet‑based video channel that produces news‑style content and allows it to speak directly to supporters without editorial mediation. The far‑right channel AUF1, founded in 2021, and the weekly newspaper Wochenblick (active 2016–2022) are documented as promoting conspiratorial, anti‑vaccine and highly populist narratives that are broadly aligned with FPÖ positions.
These outlets frequently attack mainstream journalism and political institutions, reinforcing FPÖ narratives that portray established media as biased and hostile. International monitoring of Austria’s media environment notes that the growth of such ideologically aligned digital outlets has deepened political parallelism and contributed to audience fragmentation and declining trust in journalism. In the DMI perspective, this infrastructure creates elevated risk that FPÖ’s messaging ecosystem amplifies false or misleading claims and normalises conspiracy‑laden frames, even where individual statements may not always be adjudicated as disinformation case‑by‑case.
Foreign influence and Russia‑related exposure
External analyses identify FPÖ as a key vector for Russian influence in Austrian and European politics, highlighting long‑standing political and personal ties between party elites and Russian actors. Reporting has described Austria, and especially FPÖ, as unusually receptive to Russian narratives compared to many EU member states, with repeated scrutiny of the party’s sympathetic stance towards Moscow and its criticism of EU sanctions.
At the same time, FPÖ figures have been at the centre of episodes that raised concern about the protection of sensitive institutions from external leverage, most notably the 2018 raid on the domestic intelligence service BVT while the Interior Ministry was headed by FPÖ politician Herbert Kickl. Courts later ruled that this raid was largely unlawful, and the agency was dissolved and replaced by a new structure. From a DMI standpoint, these patterns point to a high level of foreign‑influence exposure risk: a major parliamentary party with documented Russia‑friendly positions, close contacts to Russian actors, and a record of conflict with security institutions responsible for counter‑intelligence.
Media capture, platform behaviour and public service media
FPÖ combines its own communication channels with attempts to gain influence inside Austria’s public service media framework. Beyond running FPÖ‑TV, the party benefits from sympathetic coverage on AUF1 and, previously, Wochenblick, which provide it with agendasetting capacity outside mainstream outlets. In 2024, the FPÖ nominated former FPÖ/BZÖ politician Peter Westenthaler to the Board of Trustees of the public broadcaster ORF, a move that provoked resistance from journalists concerned about partisan steering of the broadcaster.
International and domestic observers note that Austria’s public broadcaster is vulnerable to political influence through party‑linked appointments, and that FPÖ is among the actors most openly advocating for a fundamental reshaping of public media along more partisan lines. In digital spaces, FPÖ politicians are highly active on social platforms and make intensive use of direct‑to‑supporter communication, which allows them to bypass conventional journalistic filters. Taken together, these dynamics correspond to a medium‑to‑high DMI risk of media‑capture strategies and platform use that weakens editorial independence and pluralistic gatekeeping.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
The FPÖ has been involved in several major political scandals with significant institutional repercussions over the last decade. The 2019 “Ibiza affair” video showed party leader and Vice‑Chancellor Heinz‑Christian Strache and Johann Gudenus discussing possible corrupt exchanges with a supposed Russian investor, leading to their resignations, the collapse of the ÖVP–FPÖ coalition and early elections. Strache was convicted in 2021 on bribery‑related charges and given a suspended sentence, but this conviction was overturned on appeal in 2023.
The 2018 raid on the domestic intelligence agency BVT, ordered while FPÖ controlled the Interior Ministry, was later judged largely unlawful by the courts and culminated in the dissolution of the service and its replacement by a new agency. More recently, parliament lifted Herbert Kickl’s immunity in December 2024 over allegations of false testimony on FPÖ campaign finances; this perjury investigation was still ongoing in mid‑2025. While Austria’s judiciary has demonstrated the capacity both to convict and to acquit senior political figures, the frequency and scale of FPÖ‑linked cases signal a medium‑to‑high integrity risk profile in the DMI framework, particularly regarding the party’s relationship with corruption controls and core state institutions.
Press freedom, harassment and hostility to independent media
In the broader media environment, FPÖ is consistently identified as one of the most confrontational actors towards critical journalism in Austria. Reports from press‑freedom organisations and country assessments note repeated instances in which FPÖ representatives have verbally attacked critical outlets, questioned their legitimacy and encouraged audiences to distrust “mainstream” or “system” media. During the period when the party controlled the Interior Ministry, guidance was issued that reportedly discouraged contacts with specific critical media, reinforcing perceptions of selective access and retaliation.
Journalists and monitors have expressed concern that FPÖ’s rhetoric and its ecosystem of aligned outlets contribute to an atmosphere in which reporters covering far‑right politics, migration or Russia risk targeted campaigns and intense online abuse. Combined with the party’s ambitions to reshape ORF and other public institutions, this pattern corresponds to a high DMI risk rating on press‑freedom and harassment: a major party that not only criticises coverage but also seeks to delegitimise and structurally weaken independent journalism as a check on political power.