Groen
EU RANK: 12 (Tier 1: Top Performance)
Groen is the Flemish Green party, operating in Flanders and Brussels, with a progressive, environmentalist and pro‑European profile. In the 2024 federal and Flemish elections it declined compared to earlier peaks but kept parliamentary representation, remaining a mid‑sized force on the Flemish centre‑left. Groen has participated in federal and regional governments in the past and is often seen as a potential coalition partner in “rainbow” or “Vivaldi”‑style coalitions.
Disinformation and alternative media
Groen, like Ecolo, communicates primarily via mainstream Flemish media (VRT and major private groups), its official channels and social media, without a dedicated alternative‑media ecosystem akin to that of Vlaams Belang. Analyses of the Belgian disinformation landscape describe Flemish far‑right networks and some anti‑system pages as key nodes in the spread of conspiracy narratives, particularly on migration, climate and COVID‑19; Groen appears mainly as a target of these campaigns rather than as an originator.
Groen’s messaging on climate, social policy and migration is fact‑oriented and aligned with scientific and EU institutional sources, and the party has been active in calling for platform regulation and media‑literacy measures against online disinformation. There is no evidence of Groen operating coordinated disinformation operations or fake‑news outlets. Its disinformation/alternative‑media risk is therefore low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Groen is part of the European Greens and supports a stronger, more integrated EU, including common climate policy, human‑rights conditionality and coordinated responses to Russian and other authoritarian disinformation. It is generally supportive of NATO and European security cooperation while advocating diplomacy and arms‑control measures.
Belgian and EU reports on foreign information manipulation highlight Russian state and proxy activities, but they do not attribute any role in enabling these operations to Groen; instead, the main domestic vectors identified are far‑right actors and certain fringe networks. Accordingly, Groen’s DMI risk on foreign‑influence is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
In the Flemish media field, power is concentrated among a few large private groups and the public broadcaster VRT, and our media‑ties analysis notes that the main party‑media entanglements involve long‑established parties and right‑wing forces more than Groen. Groen does not control major state‑owned companies or large discretionary advertising budgets in the way some other parties do, limiting its capacity for systematic media capture.
The party is a vocal defender of VRT’s independence and critical of attempts, especially from N‑VA and Vlaams Belang, to politicise or weaken the public broadcaster and to instrumentalise private media against it. Groen also supports stricter transparency rules for state advertising and ownership, which, if implemented, would constrain capture opportunities for all parties, including itself. Its media‑capture risk is therefore low–medium, driven more by structural Belgian conditions than by party behaviour.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Groen has not been at the centre of the major corruption cases and clientelist scandals that have hit some traditional Flemish parties at local and regional level. Our party‑funding analysis depicts Groen as reliant largely on public subsidies and smaller‑scale donations, with no significant business holdings or media assets and comparatively transparent reporting.
Isolated controversies at municipal level have occurred, common in a fragmented political landscape, but there is no evidence of systemic corruption within Groen comparable to high‑profile Belgian scandals. In DMI terms, Groen’s corruption and institutional‑integrity risk is low–medium, reflecting exposure to Belgium’s overall political culture but limited by its smaller patronage footprint.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Groen publicly supports press freedom, VRT’s independence and pluralistic private media. It regularly criticises hate speech and harassment directed at journalists, particularly from far‑right actors, and backs stronger rules to protect reporters and public interest journalism.
There is no indication that Groen uses exclusion tactics or public smear campaigns against critical journalists; criticisms of media usually concern perceived under‑coverage of climate issues or the framing of migration and diversity, not the legitimacy of the press itself. Within DMI, Groen’s press‑freedom and harassment risk is low.