Isamaa

EU RANK: 105 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)

Isamaa is a conservative, Christian‑democratic and national‑conservative party rooted in the early post‑independence Fatherland Coalition, combining economic liberalism with socially conservative positions and strong emphasis on Estonian language, culture and sovereignty. Led again by Urmas Reinsalu since 2023, it won about 8.2% of the vote and 8 seats in the 2023 parliamentary election, remaining a smaller but often pivotal coalition actor. Its electorate is older and more rural, including voters seeking a traditionalist alternative to both liberal Reform and populist EKRE.​

Disinformation and alternative media

Isamaa relies on mainstream media, party channels and social media, without control over major alternative or fringe outlets. Research for 2015–2025 does not show systemic, centrally coordinated disinformation campaigns run by the party, though some local activists and aligned commentators have occasionally amplified polarising narratives on identity and migration. Overall, the party’s institutional communications remain within conventional political messaging, and it is also at times targeted by far‑right critics for being “too moderate”. Disinformation/alternative media risk is low to moderate (coded as low in the DMI due to limited structural alt‑media ties).​

Foreign influence and external alignments

Isamaa is firmly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO and strongly hawkish on Russia, consistently backing sanctions, higher defence spending and robust support for Ukraine. Available evidence shows no financial or organisational ties to hostile foreign states; historically, the party has been one of the strongest advocates of Euro‑Atlantic alignment and resistance to Kremlin influence in Estonia. Foreign influence DMI risk is low.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

The party does not own major media companies and uses standard advertising purchases in commercial outlets and online platforms. While Isamaa has participated in negotiations over ERR governance when in government, the evidence points to conventional power‑sharing and ideological signalling rather than a systematic strategy to capture the public broadcaster or redirect state advertising. Internal debates over cooperation with EKRE have raised concerns among some observers, but no concrete media‑capture structures associated with Isamaa emerge from the 2015–2025 record. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is low to moderate (coded as low).

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation and corruption data for 2015–2025 show isolated controversies around individual figures linked to coalition governments, but no large, recurring corruption schemes centred on Isamaa’s core leadership. The party receives public subsidies and donations under Estonia’s party‑finance regime and complies with reporting obligations overseen by supervisory authorities, with no evidence of systematic violations. Isamaa presents itself as a rule‑of‑law and national‑interest party, although its participation in coalition governments implicated in broader scandals has occasionally exposed it to reputational risk. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is low.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

Isamaa officially supports ERR’s independence and free media, framing a pluralistic information space as important for national resilience against Russian influence. Some party politicians have criticised liberal or urban media for cultural bias, but there is no pattern of orchestrated harassment campaigns, blacklistings or punitive legal actions against journalists. Overall, the party operates within democratic norms toward the press, even when engaging in sharper rhetoric on cultural issues. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is low to moderate (coded as low).

Dimension risk table

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Low	Uses mainstream and party media; no structural alt‑media network; some polarising identity rhetoric by individuals but no systemic disinformation strategy.​
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Strongly pro‑EU/NATO and anti‑Kremlin; supports sanctions and aid to Ukraine; no hostile foreign ties identified.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Low	No major media assets; standard advertising practices; involvement in ERR governance within formal rules, without clear capture attempts.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	Low	Only isolated controversies; no recurrent leadership‑centred corruption cases; complies with party‑finance transparency rules.
Press freedom & harassment of media	Low	Formally backs independent media and ERR; occasional sharp criticism but no systematic harassment or punitive use of state power against journalists.