Italia Viva (IV)

EU RANK: 132 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)

Italia Viva (IV) is a centrist, liberal‑reformist party founded by former prime minister Matteo Renzi, advocating pro‑business policies, institutional modernisation and strong support for European integration. In the 2022 general election it ran in a joint list with Azione, securing 7.8% of the vote; in the 2024 European Parliament election the centrist “third pole” failed to reach the 4% threshold, leaving Italia Viva without representation in the European Parliament. From opposition, IV promotes itself as a pragmatic, reform‑oriented force distinct from both the right‑wing government and the traditional centre‑left, with Renzi remaining the party’s central public figure.​​

Disinformation and alternative media

Italia Viva relies on mainstream media exposure, opinion journalism and standard social‑media campaigning rather than on a dedicated network of fringe or conspiratorial outlets. Renzi’s high personal profile secures frequent invitations to talk shows and interviews, which IV uses as primary vehicles for agenda‑setting, supplemented by targeted digital advertising and party channels. Analyses of disinformation dynamics in Italy do not identify IV as a significant originator of false narratives or as the hub of a coordinated alternative‑media ecosystem; the party’s rhetoric tends to emphasise technocratic competence and institutional reform rather than anti‑system or conspiratorial themes.

While IV’s communications can be sharply critical of political rivals and media coverage, there is no evidence of a structured operation akin to algorithm‑driven mobilisation machines used by some other parties, nor of systematic deployment of fringe platforms to spread disinformation. Regulatory and fact‑checking interventions have targeted specific statements across the political spectrum, but IV is not a recurrent focus of enforcement action for organised information manipulation.​

Foreign influence and external alignments

Italia Viva is explicitly pro‑European and Atlanticist, backing deeper EU integration, fiscal‑rule reform within a rules‑based framework and continued Italian participation in NATO. It supports strong alignment with EU and G7 positions on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including sanctions and assistance to Kyiv, and frames foreign policy around liberal‑internationalist principles and economic openness. At the European level, IV situates itself in the liberal‑centrist family, seeking cooperation with like‑minded reformist forces that prioritise rule of law and market‑friendly policies.​​

Public debates about malign foreign influence in Italian politics concentrate on other actors, particularly parts of the radical right and legacy business‑political networks, rather than on Italia Viva. There is no documented pattern of structural ties between IV and authoritarian regimes or state‑aligned foreign media that would materially affect Italy’s information integrity or the party’s autonomy in foreign‑policy decisions.​

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Italia Viva does not own major media outlets and operates within, rather than atop, Italy’s hybrid media system. Its influence derives from leader‑centred visibility in quality press and television, especially political talk shows, rather than from direct editorial control or advertising leverage. IV has criticised both historical lottizzazione at RAI and more recent efforts by the Meloni government to tighten control over public broadcasting, advocating clearer governance rules and safeguards for editorial independence.

Given its size and opposition status, IV is not a central player in controversies over clientelistic distribution of public advertising or large‑scale media‑capture strategies. The party’s programme stresses transparency in public spending, including advertising and party finance, and calls for stronger, independent regulation of the media sector, aligning it more with institutional‑reform proposals than with attempts to entrench partisan control.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

The most prominent judicial issue associated with Italia Viva’s orbit has been the Open Foundation case, in which prosecutors alleged illicit party financing through a foundation linked to Renzi‑era political activities. In December 2024 a Florence judge dismissed the charges against Renzi and ten others at the preliminary stage, eliminating the risk of trial for the accused and undercutting claims of criminal liability in the affair. Separately, the CONSIP procurement case—often cited in political attacks on Renzi’s environment—ended in March 2024 with acquittals for Tiziano Renzi and former minister Luca Lotti, while some officials were convicted, indicating a mixed but not centrally Italia Viva‑centred picture.​

These judicial outcomes have been used by IV to argue that accusations against its leading figures were politically driven, though they also highlight systemic ambiguities around the use of foundations and networks in Italian political finance. Funding data show Italia Viva receiving around €1.13 million per year in “2×1000” subsidies in recent cycles, alongside private donations disclosed under Italy’s transparency rules. Overall, the party shares the broader system’s vulnerabilities around complex fundraising structures but is not currently subject to ongoing major corruption convictions.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media

Italia Viva presents itself as a defender of liberal‑democratic norms, including press freedom and judicial independence, and has criticised attempts by governments of different stripes to influence RAI or pressure journalists. Renzi has engaged in sharp public disputes with individual journalists and outlets, sometimes accusing them of bias, but there is no evidence of a systematic campaign of legal intimidation or economic pressure orchestrated by the party against critical media. Press‑freedom assessments of Italy focus on structural issues—defamation law, SLAPP risks, RAI governance and legacy media empires—without identifying IV as a primary driver of negative trends.

In parliamentary debates, Italia Viva has tended to support reforms that would curb abusive defamation suits and improve transparency, while also criticising what it views as politicised uses of the justice system against centrist leaders. This mix positions the party rhetorically as pro‑media‑freedom, even if confrontations with hostile coverage can at times be personalised and intense rather than purely institutional.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Low	Relies on mainstream media and standard digital campaigning; no evidence of a structured ecosystem of conspiratorial or systematically misleading alternative outlets.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Pro‑EU, pro‑NATO liberal‑centrist party aligned with mainstream reformist forces; no documented structural ties to authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	Low–Medium	Lacks structural media ownership and significant advertising leverage; critiques politicisation of RAI and supports transparency, while operating within Italy’s generally politicised media environment.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	Medium	Involved in high‑profile finance investigations via the Open Foundation and CONSIP, both ending in acquittals or dismissals, but highlighting systemic vulnerabilities around foundations and fundraising.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	Low–Medium	Rhetorically supports press freedom and institutional safeguards; occasional sharp personal clashes with journalists but no evidence of systematic legal or economic campaigns against critical outlets.