Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary)

EU RANK: 158 (Tier 4: Low Performance)

Jobbik is a formerly far‑right, now formally “people’s party”–style nationalist formation that has tried to reposition itself toward the centre‑right while retaining a strong focus on law‑and‑order, national sovereignty and social protection for “deserving” Hungarians. Internal splits and competition from newer far‑right actors have weakened it, but it still holds parliamentary seats and local representation.​

Disinformation and alternative media

Historically, Jobbik cultivated a dense online and alternative‑media ecosystem, including nationalist portals and social‑media pages, that amplified anti‑Roma, anti‑migrant and anti‑EU narratives; this ecosystem has partly fragmented as some outlets shifted closer to Fidesz or new extreme‑right groups. Research and monitoring from 2015–2025 continue to associate Jobbik‑linked or Jobbik‑adjacent actors with the spread of inflammatory and sometimes misleading content on minorities, migration and “Brussels”, even if the party’s official communication has moderated. Overall, its environment remains more prone to disinformation than mainstream opposition parties. Disinformation/alternative media DMI risk is high.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Jobbik has moved away from its earlier open Russophile and overtly anti‑Western positioning, now presenting itself as a patriotic, EU‑critical but not explicitly pro‑Moscow force. Nonetheless, its past contacts with Russian actors, support for Kremlin narratives and questioning of EU and NATO commitments continue to raise concerns, even if recent litigation and funding records do not document clear current hostile‑state financing. Its stance on sanctions and Ukraine is more ambiguous and sovereigntist than that of liberal or social‑democratic opposition parties. Foreign influence DMI risk is moderate to high (coded high due to legacy vulnerabilities).

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Jobbik does not control major media corporations or public broadcasters; the dominant capture structure in Hungary is centred on Fidesz‑aligned networks. Some nationalist and formerly Jobbik‑aligned outlets have migrated into the pro‑government media ecosystem, reducing the party’s direct media resources. There is limited evidence that Jobbik has used state advertising or appointments to influence media in municipalities where it participates, though its local strength is modest. Media capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate (mainly via influence in nationalist media niches rather than institutional control).

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation records from 2015–2025 include several Jobbik‑related cases—ranging from campaign‑finance and accounting irregularities to individual criminal prosecutions of party figures—but not a single, fully mapped centralised corruption scheme comparable to Fidesz‑linked state capture. Party‑funding data show reliance on public subsidies amid financial strain and debts, with some opaque aspects in past donation structures and spending. Internal splits and scandals have damaged its image and raised integrity concerns even as its systemic leverage has declined. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is moderate.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

Jobbik’s earlier era was marked by aggressive rhetoric against journalists and minority‑friendly outlets, including intimidation at demonstrations and highly confrontational language; more recently, its rebranding has led to a somewhat more conventional engagement with media, especially independent outlets critical of Fidesz. Nonetheless, parts of its base and allied nationalist media continue to attack critical journalists, and the party’s leadership does not always distance itself clearly from such hostility. It does not appear as a primary initiator of SLAPP‑style lawsuits, but its legacy and residual rhetoric warrant concern. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is moderate to high (coded high).

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	High	Long‑standing ties to nationalist alternative media; associated with inflammatory and sometimes misleading narratives on minorities, migration and EU.
Foreign influence & external alignments	High	Past Russophile and anti‑Western positioning with lingering vulnerabilities; current funding shows no clear hostile‑state control but stance on sanctions/Ukraine is ambivalent.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Moderate	No institutional control over PSB; influence mainly via nationalist media niches, some now integrated into pro‑government conglomerates.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	Moderate	Multiple irregularities and individual cases, financial strain and some opaque funding, but no single mapped systemic capture scheme.
Press freedom & harassment of media	High	History of hostile rhetoric and intimidation toward journalists; nationalist milieu still targets critical media, with inconsistent distancing by leadership.