Latvia First (Latvija pirmajā vietā, LPV)

EU RANK: 174 (Tier 5: High Risk)

Latvia First (Latvija pirmajā vietā, LPV) is a right‑wing populist party led by businessman‑turned‑politician Ainārs Šlesers, combining nationalism, social conservatism and anti‑elite rhetoric with scepticism towards established parties and parts of Latvia’s COVID‑era and economic policy. In the 2022 Saeima election it won 9 seats (6.8% of the vote) and has since operated in opposition, presenting itself as a voice for “ordinary people” against the governing coalition. In the 2024 European Parliament election LPV obtained one seat, held by former prime minister Vilis Krištopans, confirming its emergence as a significant populist actor at national and EU level.​

Disinformation and alternative media

LPV’s communication strategy is heavily personality‑driven, centred on Šlesers’ visibility in talk shows, social video and local radio rather than on a formal party‑owned media empire. Country studies describe how he and his allies use provocative statements and polarising issue framing—especially on economic grievances, vaccination policies and culture‑war topics—to secure disproportionate coverage in mainstream and online media. While LPV does not operate a dense, separate ecosystem of conspiratorial outlets, it has been associated with rhetoric that downplays or contests expert consensus on public‑health measures and portrays established institutions as corrupt or captured, which can blur into the spread of misleading narratives.

Analyses of Latvian disinformation environments focus primarily on explicitly pro‑Kremlin Russian‑language ecosystems and on parties such as For Stability!, yet they also flag the growth of populist forces that benefit from high volumes of sensational content and weak moderation in social media. In that context, LPV’s reliance on attention‑grabbing online messaging and emotional appeals raises concern about its contribution to polarised information flows, even if robust evidence of centrally coordinated inauthentic behaviour remains limited.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Latvia First presents itself as a nationalist, conservative party that formally supports Latvia’s EU and NATO membership while criticising aspects of Brussels’ migration, climate and social policies. It backs aid to Ukraine and takes a critical line towards Russia’s aggression, yet tends to frame domestic debates in terms of national sovereignty and resistance to “globalist” agendas, language that overlaps with broader European populist right rhetoric. At EU level its representatives align with Eurosceptic and right‑wing populist currents that seek to loosen integration rather than deepen it.​

Public analyses of malign foreign influence in Latvia concentrate more on openly pro‑Kremlin actors and on cases involving suspected assistance to Russia than on LPV. There is no concrete evidence that Latvia First maintains structured ties to Russian state institutions or other authoritarian regimes; however, the party operates in a space where scepticism towards EU norms and confrontational rhetoric can be exploited by hostile information actors, which keeps its external‑alignment risk above that of firmly integrationist parties.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

LPV has no major structural media ownership but leverages the fragility of local and commercial outlets through personality‑driven appearances and issue‑based campaigning. The Baltic Media Health Check and media‑pluralism research highlight how limited resources and dependence on political advertising make regional and commercial media susceptible to agenda‑setting by well‑resourced or controversial actors; LPV’s combination of public funding and donor income positions it to exploit this environment, especially during campaign periods.

Financially, Latvia First receives substantial state subsidies—around €442,000 in 2023 and €499,000 in 2024—making it one of the larger publicly funded parties in the current Saeima. At the same time, international analyses note that populist and far‑right parties, including LPV, have significantly increased their share of non‑public funding since 2019, rising from about 9% to 36% of all private donations in Latvia. This mix of generous subsidies and growing private finance heightens concerns about how LPV may deploy resources in media and advertising, especially given uneven enforcement of spending rules by KNAB.​

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

The litigation record for 2015–2025 does not show major criminal convictions against Latvia First as a party or its current leadership during this period, although founder Ainārs Šlesers has a long and controversial political history stretching back to the oligarch‑era “three A’s” (Šlesers, Lembergs, Šķēle). Earlier episodes, such as the 2017 “oligarch conversations” leak, detailed discussions among leading business‑political figures about media capture and political deals and continue to shape public perceptions of elites associated with that era, including Šlesers. However, no new large‑scale corruption convictions directly targeting LPV’s activities appear in the 2015–2025 judicial overview.

Integrity concerns therefore stem less from recent court judgments and more from structural factors: LPV’s rapid rise, heavy reliance on charismatic leadership, growing share of non‑public funding, and operation within a system where enforcement of party‑finance rules is strong on paper but weaker in practice. OECD and GRECO assessments warn that such conditions create openings for opaque donor influence and misuse of public subsidies, and LPV’s profile as a populist challenger positions it at the risky end of this spectrum, even absent headline criminal cases to date.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media

Latvia First is vocally critical of established media, frequently accusing public‑service outlets and major portals of bias or of serving the interests of the political establishment. Šlesers’ confrontational style, including sharp attacks on journalists and political opponents, contributes to a more hostile climate for reporters covering sensitive topics such as corruption, oligarchic legacies and party financing. While there is limited evidence of systematic use of defamation suits or state levers by LPV to punish critical outlets, watchdogs note that aggressive rhetoric, combined with intense supporter activity online, can have a chilling effect on critical voices, particularly in smaller media organisations.

Press‑freedom and media‑pluralism assessments for Latvia still place the country high overall, but they highlight the growing influence of populist actors in shaping narratives and pressuring journalists through public campaigns rather than formal legal measures. In this context, Latvia First’s style of politics—heavily personalised, media‑centred and often denigrating towards established outlets—raises the risk that its further growth could translate into more direct threats to editorial independence, especially at regional level.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Medium–High	Relies on sensational, personality‑driven messaging across TV, radio and social platforms; not tied to a dense conspiratorial outlet network but contributes to polarised information flows and occasionally amplifies misleading narratives.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Medium	Formally pro‑EU/NATO but aligned with Eurosceptic, right‑wing populist currents; no evidence of structured ties to authoritarian regimes, yet rhetoric can be exploited by hostile information actors.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	Medium–High	No structural ownership but benefits from substantial state subsidies and rising private donations in a fragile media market, giving it significant advertising leverage and agenda‑setting potential.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	Medium–High	No major recent convictions, but led by a figure with deep oligarch‑era connections; operates in a weak‑enforcement environment with a high, and growing, share of non‑public funding, heightening vulnerability to opaque donor influence.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	High	Frequently attacks mainstream outlets and journalists, fostering a hostile climate; while formal legal harassment is limited so far, rhetorical pressure and supporter trolling pose significant risks to critical and especially smaller media.