Most (The Bridge)
EU RANK: 133 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)
Most is a conservative‑leaning, anti‑establishment party that emerged from local reformist initiatives, particularly in Metković, promoting decentralisation, anti‑corruption and fiscal responsibility. It has played a pivotal role as a kingmaker since 2015, entering and later collapsing coalition governments with both HDZ and, indirectly, SDP‑linked actors, and remains an important parliamentary force despite electoral volatility.
Disinformation and alternative media
Most communicates through mainstream media and an active social‑media presence and has cultivated ties with some right‑leaning portals and commentators, especially around issues such as COVID‑19 measures, corruption and national sovereignty. Parts of its messaging, particularly during the pandemic, overlapped with sceptical or alarmist narratives about restrictions and institutions, though Most has not been identified as a core conspiratorial disinformation hub comparable to more radical right actors.
It uses sharp rhetoric against political elites and some institutions, which can create space for misinterpretation and amplification by fringe outlets, but there is limited evidence of centrally organised false‑news campaigns run by the party itself. Disinformation/alternative‑media risk is medium.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Most is broadly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO but stresses national sovereignty, criticising some EU decisions and opposing what it sees as excessive foreign influence over Croatian institutions and resources. On Russia and Ukraine it has supported Croatia’s formal positions but includes voices more sceptical of sanctions and Western strategies, particularly when framed as harming domestic economic interests.
There is no strong evidence that Most is structurally linked to Russian or other authoritarian influence networks; risks arise more from the domestically populist framing of issues than from clear external alignment. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is medium.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Most has not controlled national‑level media‑policy levers for prolonged periods and does not own significant media assets; its leverage comes from parliamentary bargaining power and influence in some local governments. It criticises both HDZ and SDP for media capture, focusing on the use of public advertising and party‑linked business networks, and calls for greater transparency in state‑media relations.
Given its limited time in executive office and lack of large patronage structures, Most’s media‑capture capacity is low–medium, with risks mainly hypothetical if it were to gain stronger executive control.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Most entered politics as an anti‑corruption force and has repeatedly exposed or emphasised alleged abuses by HDZ, SDP and local elites. Litigation data for 2015–2025 do not show large‑scale corruption cases centred on Most’s leadership, though internal disputes and accusations of opportunism have raised questions about its cohesion and decision‑making rather than about graft.
The party’s outsider profile and weaker ties to big business reduce classic corruption risks, but its role in destabilising coalitions has sometimes undermined institutional stability. Overall corruption and institutional‑integrity risk is low–medium.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Most politicians strongly criticise outlets they regard as aligned with HDZ or SDP, accusing them of bias or complicity in state capture, but they stop short of sustained campaigns to delegitimise the media as a whole. Individual journalists can face harsh rhetoric from some Most figures, particularly around corruption investigations or coalition breakdowns, yet there is no systematic use of state instruments to target media given Most’s limited executive power.
The party supports public‑service media in principle but demands reforms to reduce perceived political control; its press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is medium.