New Unity (Jaunā Vienotība, JV)
EU RANK: 38 (Tier 2: High Performance)
New Unity (Jaunā Vienotība, JV) is a centre‑right, liberal‑conservative alliance built around the Unity party, combining pro‑European, fiscally responsible and reformist policies with strong support for NATO and Ukraine. In the 2022 Saeima election the JV list won 26 seats (18.9% of the vote), finishing first and leading the formation of successive governments. Since September 2023 JV has headed Prime Minister Evika Siliņa’s coalition with the Union of Greens and Farmers and the Progressives, with Arvils Ašeradens serving as Unity’s party chair and Siliņa as JV’s leading figure in government. In the 2024 European Parliament election the JV list topped the poll, winning two of Latvia’s nine seats.
Disinformation and alternative media
As the principal governing force since 2019, New Unity relies on mainstream media and institutional channels rather than on a proprietary ecosystem of partisan alternative outlets. Government communication under JV has emphasised professionalised press work, regular appearances on public broadcaster LTV and commercial TV3, and cooperation with leading digital portals such as LSM and DELFI, using social media mainly to amplify official messages and campaign material. Mapping of disinformation ecosystems in Latvia focuses on Russian‑language Kremlin‑aligned outlets and more radical populist forces; JV appears mainly as an organiser of counter‑disinformation policy, not as a source of organised false narratives.
The party has been a strong supporter of restrictions on Kremlin‑state media, backing the National Electronic Mass Media Council’s bans on Russia‑registered channels and toughening of security‑driven regulation after 2022. Critics argue that this security‑first approach, combined with language‑policy reforms, risks fuelling politicisation claims, but available evidence does not associate JV with coordinated disinformation campaigns or covert use of fringe media.
Foreign influence and external alignments
New Unity is firmly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO, with leading figures such as Valdis Dombrovskis embodying Latvia’s integration into the European mainstream. JV supports robust sanctions against Russia, military and financial assistance to Ukraine, and closer European defence and energy cooperation, aligning closely with the European People’s Party family. Its foreign‑policy agenda stresses rule of law, fiscal discipline and structural reforms at EU level, positioning Latvia as a reliable partner within Euro‑Atlantic structures.
Analyses of malign foreign influence in Latvia concentrate on pro‑Kremlin networks, Russian‑language propaganda and security‑service cases involving other parties or individuals; JV emerges in these assessments as a driver of counter‑measures, including legal bans and information‑security strategies. There is no evidence of structured relationships between New Unity and authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media that would undermine Latvia’s information integrity.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
JV does not own major media companies and lacks the kind of oligarchic cross‑ownership associated with earlier eras of Latvian politics. Its influence over the media landscape stems from incumbency and from its role in shaping regulatory frameworks, particularly through support for NEPLP’s post‑invasion bans on Russia‑registered channels and through decisions affecting public‑service media funding and language policy. Public‑service media (LTV, Latvian Radio, LSM) remain legally independent, and international assessments continue to rank Latvia high on press‑freedom indices, though they note concerns about potential over‑concentration of regulatory power and the phase‑out of Russian‑language public broadcasting by 2026.
On party financing, New Unity is the largest beneficiary of state subsidies, receiving about €992,000 in 2023 and €1.12 million in 2024 under Latvia’s post‑2020 public‑funding formula, alongside comparatively modest private donations. This funding supports professional communication and campaigning but is subject to strict oversight by the anti‑corruption bureau KNAB; unlike some competitors, JV has not been subject to major KNAB sanctions for misuse of public funds or campaign‑finance violations in the 2015–2025 period.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation surveys for 2015–2025 note no major criminal convictions or party‑level corruption judgments against New Unity or its core leadership. High‑profile corruption and governance scandals during this period, such as the Aivars Lembergs cases around ZZS, the Rīga Satiksme procurement probe in Harmony’s orbit, and the 2018 KPV LV illegal‑financing investigation, have primarily involved other parties. JV figures have been present in administrative and policy litigation (for example, around Rīga City Council issues), but as complainants or institutional actors rather than as defendants in graft trials.
In financial terms, JV operates within Latvia’s state‑funding‑dominated regime, which is designed to reduce dependence on large private donors and has significantly increased public support to parties since 2020. While KNAB and international bodies such as GRECO and the OECD highlight ongoing enforcement challenges and the need for stronger auditing capacity, they do not single out New Unity as a problematic case; the main risk is system‑wide rather than party‑specific.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media
New Unity publicly positions itself as a defender of democratic institutions and an ally of independent media in the face of Russian disinformation and hybrid threats. Its governments have supported public‑service media funding and emphasised the role of LSM and LTV in providing reliable information, while also backing measures to restrict Kremlin‑aligned content and tighten security‑law enforcement online. Press‑freedom organisations generally view the Latvian environment as free and pluralistic, though they flag concerns about criminal defamation provisions, regulatory independence and minority‑language media; these critiques are directed at the system as a whole, not specifically at JV.
There is no evidence of New Unity orchestrating systematic harassment of journalists, using defamation suits as a core political weapon, or engaging in targeted economic pressure against critical outlets. Criticism of the party in domestic media tends to revolve around policy choices, coalition management and the balance between security and civil liberties, suggesting that while JV’s security‑driven agenda shapes the media context, its direct risk profile for press freedom remains relatively low compared with more confrontational or pro‑Kremlin actors.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low | Relies on mainstream and institutional channels; leads counter‑disinformation measures, with no evidence of a structured ecosystem of conspiratorial or systematically misleading alternative media. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro‑EU, pro‑NATO liberal‑conservative alliance aligned with the EPP; a driver of sanctions and support for Ukraine, with no documented ties to authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media. |
| Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control | Low–Medium | No major media ownership but significant influence via incumbency and regulatory decisions; backs security‑driven restrictions that can raise politicisation concerns, yet operates within a still‑pluralistic system. |
| Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk | Low | Not implicated in major corruption or party‑finance scandals during 2015–2025; benefits from transparent, formula‑based state subsidies overseen by KNAB. |
| Press‑freedom & harassment of media | Low–Medium | Publicly supportive of independent media and public broadcasting; security‑focused regulations affect the landscape but there is no evidence of systematic legal or economic harassment of critical outlets by the party. |