Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open VLD)

EU RANK: 45 (Tier 2: High Performance)

Open VLD is a Flemish liberal party positioned at the centre‑right on economic issues and liberal on civil liberties, strongly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO. After years as a frequent coalition partner in federal and Flemish governments, its electoral support has eroded, with results in the 2024 elections leaving it as a mid‑sized but weakened force in Flanders. The party continues to play a role in coalitions but now faces intense competition from N‑VA on the right and from centrist and green parties in urban areas.​

Disinformation and alternative media

Open VLD’s communication relies on mainstream Flemish media, its own website and social media channels, and it does not operate a dedicated alternative‑media ecosystem built around conspiratorial content. Its messaging focuses on economic liberalism, entrepreneurship, fiscal policy, civil liberties and European integration, generally framed in policy‑oriented language. Studies of the Belgian “fake news” and disinformation environment show that political use of the term “fake news” to attack journalists has increased across parties, but systematic disinformation networks are concentrated above all in far‑right and anti‑system circles rather than in traditional liberal parties.

Open VLD promotes EU and Belgian initiatives against online disinformation and supports self‑regulation and fact‑checking partnerships between platforms and news media. There is no evidence that it runs coordinated disinformation operations; its disinformation and alternative‑media risk is low.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Open VLD is firmly pro‑European and Atlanticist, favouring deeper EU integration in economic, digital and security policy, alongside a strong NATO and close cooperation with the US and other Western allies. It supports sanctions and diplomatic pressure against authoritarian regimes and backs EU‑level counter‑disinformation and cybersecurity initiatives.

Analyses of foreign information manipulation in Belgium, including EU DisinfoLab’s mapping, highlight Russian and other authoritarian influence attempts but do not associate these with Open VLD as a channel or facilitator. Its DMI foreign‑influence risk is therefore low.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

In Flanders, media ownership is concentrated and the public broadcaster VRT plays a central role, with all major parties seeking to influence the media environment through regulation, appointments and advertising. As a long‑time governing party, Open VLD has participated in this system, including through influence over media‑related portfolios and public enterprises, yet it lacks a proprietary media conglomerate and generally supports a competitive private media market combined with strong public service broadcasting.

The party’s official positions stress editorial independence at VRT and pluralism among private outlets, and it backs greater transparency in state advertising and ownership, even though it can benefit from the existing pattern of negotiated appointments. Its media‑capture risk is medium: structurally capable of exerting influence within a patronage‑coloured system, but not uniquely or aggressively focused on capturing media.​​

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Belgium’s corruption and clientelism problems cut across party lines, involving networks in several parties at local and regional levels. Open VLD has been implicated in some controversies around public contracts, inter‑municipal structures and appointments, but recent major scandals have not placed it at the very centre to the same extent as some other long‑entrenched actors.

In party‑funding terms, Open VLD relies primarily on public subsidies and reported donations, with no large in‑house media or business holdings, though individual politicians maintain close ties to economic elites and lobbying networks consistent with liberal party profiles. In DMI terms, this points to a medium corruption and institutional‑integrity risk: exposure to structural vulnerabilities and isolated cases, but no current evidence of systemic, party‑wide corruption operations.​

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

Open VLD frames itself as a defender of liberal democracy, press freedom and independent journalism, and has supported both VRT’s remit and private media pluralism. Liberal politicians have criticised specific outlets or programmes, especially when they perceive reporting as hostile or biased on fiscal or institutional issues, but such criticism is usually couched in terms of media accountability rather than wholesale delegitimisation.

There is no record of sustained harassment campaigns against journalists orchestrated by Open VLD in the way observed among some radical parties; concerns instead focus on structural influence through appointments and advertising, which are shared across governing parties. The party’s DMI risk on press‑freedom and harassment is low–medium: rhetorically supportive of free media, with some structural capacity for informal pressure in a politicised media system.​​

DimensionRisk levelShort justification
Disinformation & alternative mediaLowRelies on mainstream outlets and party channels; systematic disinformation networks in Belgium are concentrated mainly in far‑right and anti‑system spheres.​
Foreign influence & external alignmentsLowStrongly pro‑EU and Atlanticist; backs EU counter‑disinformation and sanctions against authoritarian regimes; not identified as a foreign‑influence vector.​
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB controlMediumLong‑term governing party with some leverage over media‑related portfolios and appointments in a concentrated market, though officially backing VRT independence and transparency.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity riskMediumExposed to Belgium’s clientelist structures and isolated controversies, but not central in the most serious recent scandals.
Press‑freedom & harassment of mediaLow–MediumPublicly defends press freedom; criticism of outlets occurs but without systematic harassment campaigns, amid broader structural influence channels.​