Partito Democratico (PD)

EU RANK: 63 (Tier 2: High Performance)

The Partito Democratico (PD) is a centre‑left, social‑democratic party that positions itself as pro‑European and progressive on social and environmental issues. In the 2022 general election the PD‑IDP list obtained around 19% of the vote, remaining the main opposition force, while in the 2024 European Parliament election PD won 24.1%, finishing second but significantly closing the gap with Fratelli d’Italia. Since 2023 the party has been led by Elly Schlein, under whom PD has emphasised labour rights, climate policy and civil‑rights agendas while attempting to rebuild a broad centre‑left coalition against the governing right.​​

Disinformation and alternative media

PD primarily relies on mainstream media, party publications and conventional social‑media campaigning rather than on a dense network of partisan alternative outlets. Its communications strategy focuses on programmatic messaging, parliamentary activity and leader‑centred campaigning, with fact‑based critiques of the government and appeals to European norms, rather than conspiratorial or anti‑system narratives. Studies of disinformation in Italy tend to foreground far‑right and anti‑establishment ecosystems, with PD appearing mainly as a target of hostile narratives rather than as an orchestrator of them.

The party does operate its own digital channels and sympathetic opinion spaces in sections of the press, and like any major actor it seeks favourable framing of contested issues. However, there is no documented PD‑centred network equivalent to Lega’s “La Bestia” or to structured extremist platforms that specialise in spreading false or conspiratorial content, and regulatory interventions on online manipulation have not identified PD as a primary source of organised disinformation campaigns.​

Foreign influence and external alignments

PD is firmly integrated into the European social‑democratic mainstream as a member of the Party of European Socialists and the Socialists & Democrats group in the European Parliament. It advocates stronger European integration, rule‑of‑law conditionality and EU‑level responses to climate change, inequality and migration, aligning its foreign‑policy outlook with that of other centre‑left parties in Western Europe. On security issues PD supports NATO membership, condemns Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and backs sanctions and military‑aid packages consistent with Italy’s commitments as an EU and NATO member.​​

Analyses of external influence in Italian politics focus more on ties between parts of the radical right and actors in Moscow or Budapest than on PD. There is no evidence that PD maintains structured relationships with authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media that would give those actors privileged leverage over its positions or Italy’s information space.​

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Historically, PD and its centre‑left predecessors had close relationships with segments of the print quality press and, at times, with parts of RAI’s governance, reflecting Italy’s broader system of party‑linked media pluralism. In recent years, however, the main media‑capture concerns have centred on the right, particularly Forza Italia’s Mediaset orbit and, since 2022, accusations that the Meloni government has politicised RAI appointments and programming. PD now positions itself as a defender of public‑service media independence and has criticised what it describes as attempts to “Orbanise” RAI through patronage and editorial pressure.

While PD‑led administrations have also participated in the traditional distribution of public advertising and appointments, recent scandals over clientelistic advertising contracts and public‑media capture have not primarily implicated the party. Its current policy platform includes calls for greater transparency in public advertising, stronger safeguards for RAI’s autonomy and anti‑SLAPP reforms to protect critical journalism, placing it more on the protective than the capture‑oriented side of Italy’s media debates.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

PD has been touched by corruption‑related controversies over the past decade, but it has not been at the centre of the most emblematic recent scandals, which have more heavily affected Lega and Forza Italia. The “Mafia Capitale” investigations into Rome’s procurement networks had bipartisan implications and involved figures in PD’s orbit, yet the resulting jurisprudence on corruption‑mafia links applies across the party system rather than uniquely to PD. More recent high‑profile proceedings, such as the CONSIP procurement case, ended in 2024 with acquittals for PD‑linked figures like former minister Luca Lotti and for Tiziano Renzi, strengthening the narrative that some earlier accusations were not substantiated in court.​

Overall, PD operates within Italy’s structurally vulnerable environment of complex party finance and patronage, but without an ongoing, large‑scale party‑funds scandal comparable to Lega’s “49‑million” affair. Its funding mix combines substantial public “2×1000” subsidies (PD has consistently been the largest recipient) with donations that have declined from about €4 million in 2022 to roughly €1.9 million in 2023, a shift that increases dependence on small donors and public transfers but also reflects relatively transparent reporting of its finances.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media

PD’s public discourse presents the party as a defender of press freedom, pluralism and judicial independence, and its leaders have been vocal critics of perceived government interference in RAI and of the heavy resort to defamation lawsuits by figures on the right. Press‑freedom organisations and EU rule‑of‑law reports generally view PD as part of the political camp resisting concentration of media power and pushing for safeguards against political interference, rather than as a source of overt pressure on journalists. The party has supported reforms to curb abusive defamation suits and to strengthen protections for investigative reporting, aligning itself with recommendations from European institutions and media‑freedom NGOs.

This does not mean PD is entirely detached from Italy’s patronage‑based media ecosystem: in office it has participated in appointment bargaining and public‑advertising allocations, and individual politicians sometimes respond sharply to hostile coverage. Yet available evidence does not associate PD with systematic harassment campaigns, punitive advertising boycotts or legal intimidation against media; instead, it is more frequently cast as an institutional ally in debates on safeguarding RAI and improving the legal environment for journalists.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Low	Relies on mainstream outlets and party channels; not linked to a structured ecosystem of conspiratorial or systematically misleading alternative media.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low	Pro‑EU, pro‑NATO social‑democratic party embedded in the PES/S&D family, with no evidence of structured ties to authoritarian regimes or state‑aligned foreign media.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	Low–Medium	Operates within Italy’s politicised media system and has historic ties to parts of RAI and the quality press, but recent capture concerns focus more on the right; currently advocates stronger safeguards for public service media.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	Low–Medium	Exposed to system‑wide patronage and finance vulnerabilities, yet not central to major ongoing party‑funds scandals; several high‑profile figures recently acquitted in prominent cases.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	Low	Positions itself as a defender of media pluralism and judicial independence; not identified by watchdogs as a significant source of harassment or abusive litigation against journalists.