Rassemblement National (RN)

EU RANK: 160 (Tier 4: Low Performance)

Rassemblement National is France’s principal far-right party, nationalist and anti-immigration, led by Jordan Bardella with Marine Le Pen as its dominant strategic figure. In the 2024 snap legislative elections, RN topped the first round but finished third in seats after second-round “republican front” dynamics; the RN-led bloc won about 142 seats, with RN itself around 126 MPs. RN’s electorate has broadened substantially, with strong support among working-class voters, lower-income regions, and constituencies mobilised by sovereignty, identity and law-and-order narratives.

Disinformation and alternative media

RN benefits from structural amplification in an increasingly opinion-led media environment. The rise of talk/opinion programming, especially in parts of the Bolloré/Vivendi ecosystem, has coincided with a wider mainstreaming of far-right narratives, even when not directly party-controlled. RN also invests heavily in platform-native campaigning, with Jordan Bardella’s short-video presence particularly strong, supporting direct mobilisation and agenda-setting among younger audiences. While pluralism rules ensure RN access across mainstream broadcasters during election windows, its ecosystem advantage lies in repetition, framing and clip-based circulation across social platforms. Disinformation/alternative media risk is moderate to high.

Foreign influence and external alignments

The most concrete integrity concerns in the records reviewed relate to EU-institutional funding and party-finance controversies rather than proven hostile-state patronage. However, RN’s political ecosystem is structurally more exposed to transnational far-right networks and external amplification dynamics than mainstream parties, and repeated finance controversies can intersect with questions of external alignment and credibility. On the basis of the available record, this is best characterised as vulnerability risk rather than documented foreign control. Foreign influence DMI risk is moderate.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

RN does not own major media assets, but it enjoys significant leverage through sympathetic or ideologically adjacent opinion ecosystems that can elevate narratives and normalise frames. RN also sustains a confrontational posture toward “system media” and public broadcasters, contributing to pressure dynamics on journalists through delegitimisation and supporter mobilisation. Arcom’s tightened pluralism monitoring offers guardrails, but it does not eliminate the structural advantages of opinion-led formats and cross-media synergies. Media capture, advertising and PSB-control DMI risk is moderate.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

According to our research, RN shows the most severe integrity exposure in the 2015–2025 litigation record. It includes major EU funds/assistants proceedings culminating in a 2025 criminal-court conviction affecting Marine Le Pen and the party as a legal entity (with major penalties and an ineligibility component noted as provisional pending appeal), alongside earlier “Jeanne” micro-party fraud convictions and a later headquarters raid linked to campaign finance suspicions. Even allowing for appeals and ongoing investigations, this is a sustained pattern of high-stakes legal exposure involving party finance and misuse-of-funds allegations. In funding terms, RN’s 2023 accounts show modest private donations (~€623k) relative to substantial public subsidy (~€10.1m), suggesting that the core risk is compliance and finance governance rather than donor opacity alone. DMI corruption and institutional integrity risk is high.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

RN’s stance toward media is frequently adversarial. The media ecosystem record notes patterns of far-right formations excluding certain outlets and reinforcing anti-media narratives; even without formal censorship tools, this can foster intimidation dynamics and contribute to harassment of journalists via supporter networks. The risk is therefore primarily pressure-based—delegitimisation, online harassment spillovers, and event access disputes—rather than direct institutional control. Press freedom and harassment DMI risk is moderate to high.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Moderate–High	Strong amplification via opinion-TV ecosystems and short-video mobilisation; clip-based circulation increases misinformation and polarisation spillover risk.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Moderate	No proven hostile-state control in the records reviewed, but heightened susceptibility to transnational amplification and credibility risks from EU-finance controversies.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	Moderate	No ownership, but significant leverage via sympathetic opinion ecosystems and sustained pressure rhetoric toward PSB/legacy media.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	High	Major 2015–2025 legal exposure (EU funds convictions, finance probes, raids) affecting party leadership and organisation.
Press freedom & harassment of media	Moderate–High	Exclusion and anti-media narratives increase intimidation and harassment risks through supporter ecosystems.