Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske (SDP / Social Democratic Party of Croatia)
EU RANK: 94 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)
Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske (SDP) is Croatia’s main centre‑left, social‑democratic party and the principal competitor to HDZ. It has led several governments since independence, presiding over major stages of EU integration, but has recently suffered electoral fragmentation and internal splits while still remaining a key parliamentary force.
Disinformation and alternative media
SDP communicates through mainstream television, newspapers, online portals and party channels, and does not rely on fringe or conspiratorial media ecosystems. Its messaging focuses on welfare, labour rights, public services, rule of law and secularism, articulated within a pro‑EU, pro‑NATO framework.
Croatian disinformation studies locate the main hubs of fabricated or conspiratorial content in radical‑right and anti‑vaccine networks rather than in mainstream left or centre‑left parties. SDP has sometimes struggled to respond effectively to online smear campaigns but is not identified as a significant originator of disinformation. Its disinformation/alternative‑media risk is low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
SDP is firmly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO and belongs to the Party of European Socialists, supporting EU sanctions against Russia and other authoritarian regimes and advocating strong alignment with Western partners. It emphasises multilateralism, human rights and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, and has not promoted Eurosceptic or pro‑Kremlin narratives.
There is no public evidence of structural ties between SDP and Russian or other authoritarian information‑operations networks; its vulnerabilities are similar to those of other mainstream parties that govern exposed sectors, but with a consistently Atlanticist orientation. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
As one of the two major governing parties, SDP has had opportunities to influence media policy, public‑service broadcaster HRT and state advertising, particularly when leading centre‑left coalitions. In office, it has used appointment powers and public‑company advertising in ways that critics see as continuing Croatia’s broader pattern of politicised media rather than decisively dismantling it.
However, the structural instruments of capture (dense local patronage networks, long‑term control over state‑owned enterprises) have historically been stronger under HDZ than under SDP governments. SDP’s media‑capture DMI risk is medium: participates in a clientelist system but is not the primary architect in the current era.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation data show that individual SDP politicians have been investigated or tried for corruption, abuse of office and conflicts of interest, particularly at local and sectoral level, though the scale and frequency of major scandals is generally lower than for HDZ. As a large governing party, SDP has nonetheless managed significant public resources and public companies, which exposes it to patronage and integrity risks when internal controls are weak.
EU and domestic watchdogs have criticised both big parties for insufficient progress in dismantling systemic corruption, noting that SDP governments have often failed to use their mandates to enact deeper reforms of the judiciary and prosecution services. Overall corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk for SDP is medium.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
SDP publicly supports media freedom and has often positioned itself as more favourable to independent and critical journalism than HDZ, especially on issues of historical revisionism and minority rights. Nonetheless, during its periods in power, critical outlets and journalists have reported economic and access pressures and politicised decision‑making at HRT and in state advertising, reflecting a continuation of systemic practices rather than a clean break.
SDP leaders rarely use the strongly delegitimising language towards media that characterises parts of the radical right, but they do complain about bias and occasionally attack individual outlets, which can contribute to a polarised media climate. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is medium.