Trikolóra

EU RANK: 197 (Tier 5: High Risk)

Trikolóra is a small, hard‑Eurosceptic and nationalist party founded by Václav Klaus Jr., advocating Czexit‑leaning positions, rejection of “EU diktat”, opposition to migration and “gender ideology”. It has limited parliamentary representation on its own but cooperates with other radical‑right forces and influences parts of the conservative media space.

Disinformation and alternative media

Trikolóra is strongly present in alternative right‑wing media—blogs, YouTube channels and portals critical of the EU, climate science and mainstream journalism. Its leaders frequently repeat or amplify conspiratorial narratives about Brussels, COVID‑19 measures, climate “hoaxes” and alleged censorship by Big Tech and PSBs.

Our sources link Trikolóra‑adjacent channels to the wider Czech pro‑Kremlin and anti‑system disinformation environment, often sharing content from Russian state media or fringe foreign outlets. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is high.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Trikolóra promotes a worldview close to that of Russian and other illiberal regimes: hostility toward EU integration, admiration for “sovereign democracy”, and scepticism toward NATO and support for Ukraine. It questions sanctions and arms deliveries and argues for a “neutral” Czech foreign policy, positions that directly align with Russian strategic objectives.

There is no open evidence of Russian funding, but the degree of narrative alignment and networking in shared information spaces indicates high susceptibility to hostile influence. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is high.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Trikolóra lacks the electoral weight and economic base to capture mainstream outlets; its strategy is to delegitimise PSBs and rely on its own online ecosystem and sympathetic commercial commentators. It calls for deep cuts or abolition of television licence fees and a radical overhaul of Česká televize.

If its influence or alliances grew, these positions would directly threaten media independence. Current media‑capture DMI risk is medium–high given low capacity but clear intent.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation records do not yet show large‑scale corruption involving Trikolóra due to its small size and limited access to state resources. The main institutional risk stems from its programme—support for referendums on EU membership, rejection of some international obligations and attempts to delegitimise judicial and regulatory institutions seen as “globalist”.

Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is therefore medium–high despite fewer financial scandals.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

Trikolóra politicians consistently attack mainstream and public‑service media as biased and “censored by Brussels”, encouraging supporters to rely on alternative portals that often spread disinformation. Journalists covering far‑right politics and Russian influence have been targeted by online abuse and smear pieces in Trikolóra‑adjacent media.

The party’s programme includes measures that would sharply reduce PSB funding and influence, threatening press freedom if implemented. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is high.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	High	Actively participates in anti‑EU, anti‑vax and pro‑Kremlin disinformation ecosystems.
Foreign influence & external alignments	High	Positions on EU, NATO and Ukraine mirror Russian strategic narratives.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	Medium–High	No big outlets yet, but advocates defunding and radical restructuring of PSBs.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	Medium–High	Few financial cases but programme undermines core democratic and international commitments.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	High	Persistent delegitimisation of mainstream media and encouragement of harassment by supporters.