Union of Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, ZZS)

EU RANK: 147 (Tier 4: Low Performance)

The Union of Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, ZZS) is an agrarian, green‑conservative alliance that combines rural‑interest advocacy with pragmatic centrism and a tradition of regional power‑brokers. In the 2022 Saeima election it won 16 seats (12.6% of the vote), finishing second, and in September 2023 it joined Prime Minister Evika Siliņa’s coalition alongside New Unity and the Progressives, with board chair Armands Krauze serving as agriculture minister. ZZS did not secure representation in the 2024 European Parliament election, as former partners stood on separate lists, but it remains a key governing force with strong rural and regional networks.​

Disinformation and alternative media

ZZS has historically benefited from influence in local and regional media rather than from a dedicated national‑level alternative media ecosystem. Academic and NGO studies document how long‑time Ventspils mayor and ZZS figurehead Aivars Lembergs used ownership and influence over outlets such as Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze and municipal media to secure favourable coverage and blurred lines between news and political PR. However, Lembergs’ conviction in 2021, partial confirmation on appeal in 2023 and U.S. Magnitsky sanctions since 2019 have weakened his overt leverage and made media ties politically costly, even as narratives portraying him as a “martyr” persist in some pro‑Kremlin and sympathetic outlets.

Beyond this legacy, ZZS relies on standard campaigning through public broadcaster LTV, commercial TV, DELFI and regional newspapers, plus social media; it is not identified as a central organiser of online disinformation campaigns in contemporary mapping of Latvian information threats. The main risk lies in the residual influence of business‑political networks in local media markets rather than in systematic production of conspiratorial content.​

Foreign influence and external alignments

ZZS presents itself as a pragmatic, centrist and largely pro‑EU force, supporting Latvia’s NATO membership and security commitments while prioritising rural development, agriculture and social policy. It has backed sanctions against Russia and assistance to Ukraine, aligning with the broad national consensus on security, even as some of its traditional voter base overlaps with more cautious or economically concerned constituencies. At European level, ZZS has cooperated with agrarian and centrist groups rather than with explicitly Eurosceptic or pro‑Kremlin formations.​​

Analyses of malign foreign influence in Latvia concentrate on explicitly pro‑Russia actors and on Russian‑language media rather than on ZZS. There is no evidence of structured ties between the alliance and authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media; external‑influence concerns focus instead on the domestic oligarchic networks that historically surrounded figures like Lembergs.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

ZZS is the clearest Latvian example of a party orbit intertwined with media ownership and local‑press dominance, particularly through Aivars Lembergs’ past stakes and influence. Studies by Latvian NGOs and international monitors describe how Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze and Ventspils‑linked municipal outlets carried consistently favourable coverage of Lembergs and ZZS and, in some cases, blurred editorial and advertising content, raising long‑term concerns about media capture at the local level. Although court judgments and sanctions have reduced overt control, these legacies continue to shape how journalists and voters interpret ZZS’s relationship with the media.

At the same time, ZZS now operates in a more regulated environment with stronger public‑funding rules and closer scrutiny of party finances and municipal advertising. The alliance receives large state subsidies—about €796,000 in 2023 and €891,000 in 2024—with KNAB withholding a small portion (€7,382.58) in 2024 over unlawful spending not repaid on time. This shows that while the party no longer depends primarily on oligarch‑linked media to reach voters, questions about its financial discipline and historical media practices remain relevant to media‑capture risk assessments.

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

ZZS’s integrity profile is dominated by the long‑running corruption proceedings against Aivars Lembergs. In February 2021 the Rīga Regional Court convicted him on multiple counts, including bribery and money‑laundering, sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment, a €20,000 fine and extensive asset confiscation; in September 2023 the same court partly reduced the sentence to four years but upheld core corruption findings, and the case is now before the Supreme Court on cassation. Earlier investigations, such as KNAB’s 2016 raid on Jūrmala mayor Gatis Truksnis in a suspected illegal party‑financing case, reinforced perceptions of problematic fundraising in ZZS’s orbit.​

These cases have not prevented ZZS from re‑entering government, but they contribute to a persistent narrative of oligarchic influence and governance risks associated with the alliance. KNAB’s partial withholding of state funding in 2024 for late repayment of unlawful spending, though smaller in scale than Lembergs’ cases, underscores ongoing compliance challenges under Latvia’s stricter party‑finance regime. Taken together, these factors place ZZS near the higher end of institutional‑integrity risk among Latvia’s mainstream parties.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of critical media

Press‑freedom reports and academic studies highlight ZZS’s historic entanglement with local media as a key example of how political‑business elites can shape coverage without overt censorship, especially in regions with fragile, advertising‑dependent outlets. Investigative reporting on Ventspils governance and Lembergs’ networks—by LSM, DFRLab and others—played a major role in exposing these patterns, and the subsequent criminal convictions and sanctions reduced direct leverage, illustrating the corrective potential of independent media and courts.

There is limited evidence of ZZS systematically using defamation suits or administrative pressure to silence critics at the national level; instead, concerns centre on subtler forms of influence via ownership, advertising and municipal patronage. As Latvia strengthens regulatory oversight and as public‑service media maintain a strong watchdog role, ZZS’s ability to shape the information environment through these means has decreased, but the legacy of past practices keeps its press‑freedom risk higher than that of parties without such histories.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	Medium	Relies on mainstream and regional outlets; not central in disinformation mapping, but past use of friendly local media and blurred PR/editorial lines raises concerns about information neutrality.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Low–Medium	Pragmatic, broadly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO; external‑influence concerns focus on domestic oligarchic networks, not on ties to authoritarian regimes or foreign state‑aligned media.
Media‑capture & advertising / PSB control	Medium–High	Long history of media influence via Lembergs‑linked outlets and municipal advertising; overt leverage reduced by convictions and sanctions, but structural legacies and regional‑media fragility persist.
Corruption & institutional‑integrity risk	High	Central figure Lembergs convicted of serious corruption offences with appeal partially upholding findings; earlier financing probes and KNAB’s recent withholding of funds highlight enduring integrity vulnerabilities.
Press‑freedom & harassment of media	Medium–High	Independent investigations into ZZS‑linked governance faced hostile local environments in the past; while direct legal harassment is limited, historic ownership and patronage patterns have posed significant risks to local media independence.