Alternattiva Demokratika – Partit Demokratiku (ADPD – The Green Party)
EU RANK: 60 (Tier 2: High Performance)
ADPD is a green, progressive party that combines environmentalism, social liberalism and strong rule‑of‑law and governance‑reform priorities, positioning itself as Malta’s main pro‑EU green alternative to the PL–PN duopoly. Formed in 2020 through the merger of Alternattiva Demokratika (the historical Green Party) and Partit Demokratiku, it is led collectively by figures including Carmel Cacopardo and Sandra Gauci and has remained active in national politics despite not winning parliamentary seats under Malta’s single transferable vote system. The party’s influence stems from persistent advocacy on climate, good governance and electoral reform rather than electoral strength, which has remained at low single‑digit levels in general and European Parliament elections.
Disinformation and alternative media
ADPD operates on a small scale, relying on its website, social‑media channels and occasional appearances on party and independent media rather than running its own broadcast outlets or large partisan “news” portals. In Malta’s highly polarised media landscape—dominated by PL’s ONE and PN’s NET plus the contested public broadcaster TVM—ADPD struggles for airtime and visibility, and its communication strategy centres on issue‑based statements, press conferences and alliances with civil‑society actors. There is no evidence that ADPD has organised disinformation campaigns, operated troll networks or coordinated false‑news ecosystems during 2015–2025; available monitoring instead highlights the party as a critic of media capture and political parallelism, not as a source of it. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
ADPD is explicitly pro‑EU and affiliated with the European Green and Global Greens families, supporting stronger European action on climate, social rights and rule of law. As a small extra‑parliamentary party, it does not receive the 100,000‑euro annual parliamentary grant that Partit Laburista and Partit Nazzjonalista enjoy, and instead relies on modest donations and membership contributions regulated under Malta’s party‑financing laws. Donation reports filed with the Electoral Commission show small‑scale fundraising; unlike the major parties, ADPD’s totals are low and publicly reported, with no sign of large opaque foreign inflows. There are no credible allegations in 2015–2025 of hostile‑state funding, foreign control or links to authoritarian networks involving ADPD. Foreign‑influence and external‑alignment DMI risk is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
ADPD does not own television, radio or major print outlets and is structurally disadvantaged in a system where the governing Labour Party controls ONE TV/Radio and the Nationalist Party controls NET TV/Radio alongside significant influence over TVM. Media‑pluralism assessments and ADPD’s own public statements repeatedly underline that Malta’s party‑owned broadcasters and politicised public service media crowd out smaller parties and limit their access to audiences. The party has instead used legal and political channels to contest structural bias—for example by mounting constitutional challenges to the electoral and gender‑corrective mechanisms, explicitly linking them to unequal media and institutional treatment, even though these cases have so far been dismissed at first instance. There is no indication that ADPD has used state advertising, appointments or regulatory capture to shape media in its favour; its role is that of a reform advocate in a system dominated by much larger party media empires. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is low.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
ADPD features in Malta’s litigation records mainly as a plaintiff challenging aspects of the electoral system rather than as a defendant in corruption or financing scandals. Between 2022 and 2024 the party led a constitutional case against the gender‑corrective mechanism and related electoral‑law provisions, arguing that they discriminated against smaller parties under the existing STV plus corrective overlay; the First Hall Civil Court dismissed the challenge in late 2024 and the party has appealed. No major criminal or corruption proceedings in 2015–2025 centre on ADPD leaders or finances, and watchdog and media reporting on funding opacity in Malta focuses overwhelmingly on the two big parties rather than on minor actors. Within a national system marked by serious rule‑of‑law concerns and opaque finance at the top, ADPD’s profile is that of a small, rule‑of‑law‑oriented party with no recorded grand‑corruption cases. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is low.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
ADPD consistently criticises Malta’s politicised media structure, calling for party divestment from broadcasters and for stronger protections for independent journalism in the wake of the Daphne Caruana Galizia assassination and subsequent public inquiry. The party relies on independent outlets such as Times of Malta, MaltaToday and The Malta Independent—as well as civil‑society groups like Repubblika—to amplify its positions, and is not associated with SLAPP‑type litigation or organised campaigns against journalists. In press‑freedom debates about anti‑SLAPP laws, PBS governance and party‑owned media, ADPD generally aligns with reformist civil‑society voices rather than incumbents benefiting from the status quo. Press‑freedom and harassment‑of‑media DMI risk is low.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low | Small, issue‑based party with no broadcast outlets; relies on website, social media and independent press, with no evidence of disinformation networks or false‑news campaigns. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro‑EU green party funded through modest domestic donations and not eligible for large parliamentary grants; no hostile‑state funding allegations. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Low | Owns no major media and instead challenges Malta’s party‑media duopoly through legal and political reform campaigns; no sign of capture behaviour. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Low | Appears in courts mainly as plaintiff challenging electoral rules; no major corruption or funding‑scandal cases involving its leadership. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | Low | Aligns with civil‑society calls for media‑ownership reform and stronger journalist protection; not linked to SLAPPs or harassment of reporters. |
