Chega

EU RANK: 176 (Tier 5: High Risk)

Chega is a radical‑right, nationalist and anti‑establishment party that combines punitive law‑and‑order proposals, anti‑Roma and anti‑migrant rhetoric, social conservatism and hostility toward “the system”, while remaining formally pro‑NATO and critical of some aspects of the EU. Founded in 2019, it has rapidly expanded its parliamentary representation and influence over the broader right‑wing agenda.​

Disinformation and alternative media

Chega relies heavily on social media, partisan online portals and sympathetic TV and radio commentators, using emotionally charged narratives about crime, corruption, welfare “abuse”, migration and minorities. Monitoring of the Portuguese information environment between 2019 and 2025 links Chega leaders and aligned pages to repeated dissemination of misleading or false claims on Roma communities, crime statistics, gender equality and pandemic measures, often later corrected by fact‑checkers. This ecosystem frequently blurs the line between opinion, sensationalism and verifiable fact, making it a central vector of radical‑right disinformation in Portugal. Disinformation and alternative‑media DMI risk is high.

Foreign influence and external alignments

Chega presents itself as a defender of national sovereignty within the EU and NATO, aligning rhetorically with other European radical‑right parties on migration, “gender ideology” and opposition to “Brussels elites”. Party‑funding and litigation records up to 2025 do not document verified direct financing or strategic control by hostile foreign states, though the party cultivates links with like‑minded European and Brazilian right‑wing figures and sometimes echoes narratives popular in broader far‑right transnational networks. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is moderate (narrative alignment without proven hostile‑state funding).

Media capture, advertising and public service media

Chega does not control RTP or major media conglomerates but exerts significant agenda‑setting power through its intense presence on talk shows, social media and friendly outlets that amplify its controversies. In municipalities and regional bodies where it gains leverage, there are emerging concerns about pressure on local media and use of institutional channels for partisan communication, although large‑scale state‑advertising‑based media capture comparable to some Central‑European cases is not yet documented. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate to high (coded high because of its demonstrated ability to build parallel information ecosystems and pressure pluralistic debate).

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation records from 2019–2025 list multiple investigations and court cases involving Chega representatives, including accusations of racist and hate‑speech offences, campaign‑finance irregularities and disputes over internal party governance, though not yet a single consolidated grand‑corruption scheme. Party‑finance data point to rapid growth funded by public subsidies, member contributions and donations, with concerns raised about transparency, internal controls and the role of individual high‑income supporters. The party’s anti‑corruption rhetoric contrasts with emerging questions about its own standards and internal discipline. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is moderate.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

Chega’s leadership frequently attacks journalists and outlets it perceives as hostile, labelling them “corrupt”, “liars” or enemies of the people, and encourages supporters to treat critical media as part of the “system” it opposes. Reporters covering the party and sensitive topics such as racism or gender often face online harassment from its base, fuelled by confrontational statements from leaders, although systematic physical violence remains rare. While the party has used legal complaints and defamation suits on occasion, its main impact on press freedom stems from verbal aggression, delegitimisation and coordinated supporter harassment. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is high.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	High	Central user of social media and partisan portals spreading misleading claims on crime, minorities and COVID‑19, frequently corrected by fact‑checking.
Foreign influence & external alignments	Moderate	Aligns rhetorically with European and Brazilian radical‑right networks but no verified hostile‑state financing documented in funding or litigation records.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	High	No structural control of RTP yet, but strong influence via alternative ecosystems and growing ability to pressure local media and polarise public debate.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	Moderate	Multiple legal disputes over hate speech, finances and internal governance, with transparency concerns but no mapped large‑scale graft scheme so far.
Press freedom & harassment of media	High	Aggressive anti‑media rhetoric and supporter harassment of journalists, especially on race and gender issues, create a chilling effect on coverage.