Lewica (The Left)
EU RANK: 74 (Tier 2: High Performance)
Lewica is a centre‑left, social‑democratic and progressive alliance built around Nowa Lewica and allied groups, advocating expanded social rights, civil liberties and a strongly pro‑EU orientation. It won 8.6% of the vote and 26 seats in the 2023 Sejm election and has governed since December 2023 as a junior coalition partner, with Krzysztof Gawkowski serving as deputy prime minister responsible for digital affairs.
Disinformation and alternative media
Analyses of Poland’s media system describe Lewica as operating mainly through mainstream broadcasters, print outlets and online channels rather than owning a distinct party media empire. The alliance has focused its communication on civil‑rights, social and rule‑of‑law themes, often in sharp contrast to PiS narratives, but available monitoring does not attribute to it coordinated disinformation networks or fabricated‑news platforms. Studies of alternative ecosystems point instead to right‑wing networks such as TV Republika and social‑media influencers around Confederation as the primary vectors of polarising content. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Lewica is clearly pro‑EU and supports deeper European integration, social‑rights protections and alignment with EU rule‑of‑law standards. The party receives standard state subventions, amounting to roughly 11.5 million zloty per year in the current term, and much smaller volumes of private donations (about 378,000 zloty in 2023), according to National Electoral Commission filings. Public funding thus dominates its finances, and there are no major scandals involving illicit foreign donations or covert external control linked to Lewica in 2020–2025 analyses. Foreign‑influence and external‑alignment DMI risk is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
During the PiS era, Lewica acted as a vocal critic of TVP’s propaganda, SLAPP‑style pressures and discriminatory content on abortion and LGBT issues, arguing for de‑politicisation and stronger safeguards. Since entering government in December 2023, Left ministers have taken part in debates on broadcaster conduct and digital‑platform regulation; some tougher statements on licence withdrawal have drawn free‑speech concerns, including from coalition partners, but there is no evidence of an ownership‑based capture strategy or use of state‑owned companies to build a partisan media sector. The alliance remains primarily engaged through policy and parliamentary tools rather than asset control or advertising leverage. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is low to moderate.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation overviews indicate that Lewica has more often been a plaintiff or intervenor in cases challenging PiS‑era abortion restrictions and judicial‑independence reforms than a subject of corruption prosecutions itself. Court battles around the 2020 Constitutional Tribunal ruling on abortion and subsequent legislative attempts in 2024 show the alliance as a key political‑legal actor, but not as a defendant in major graft or party‑finance cases. No significant criminal convictions of Lewica’s national leadership for corruption or misuse of funds appear in the 2015–2025 review. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is low.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Lewica has consistently framed its agenda around defending civil liberties, minority rights and judicial independence, positions that align with stronger protections for journalists and independent media. The alliance opposed PiS‑linked SLAPP‑style pressures and condemned discriminatory or hate‑laden broadcasts, while its own role in legal cases has centred on challenging restrictive laws rather than suing journalists. There is no evidence of systematic use of defamation suits or other legal tools by Lewica to intimidate media actors. Press‑freedom and harassment‑of‑media DMI risk is low.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low | Communicates via mainstream and digital channels without a dedicated disinformation ecosystem; alternative polarising media are associated mainly with right‑wing actors. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro‑EU alliance funded chiefly by state subventions and modest donations, with no major foreign‑funding scandals. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Low–Moderate | Strong critic of PiS‑era TVP and engaged in post‑2023 reforms; occasional tough rhetoric on licences but no ownership or SOE‑advertising capture strategy. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Low | Prominent in civil‑rights and rule‑of‑law litigation but not in major corruption or party‑finance prosecutions. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | Low | Aligns with media‑freedom and civil‑liberties agendas and is not associated with SLAPP‑type litigation against journalists. |