Moderaterna (M – Moderate Party)
EU RANK: 116 (Tier 3: Moderate Performance)
Moderaterna is Sweden’s lead governing party, anchored in a liberal-conservative tradition framed around “freedom and responsibility.” Led by Ulf Kristersson, who serves as Prime Minister, the party won 19.10% (68 seats) in the 2022 Riksdag election and 17.53% (4 seats) in the 2024 European Parliament elections. Since 2022, Moderaterna has led a minority coalition with Kristdemokraterna and Liberalerna that relies on parliamentary cooperation with Sverigedemokraterna under the Tidö Agreement framework. A significant reputational episode occurred in July 2025, when Migration Minister Johan Forssell faced a public scandal after revelations that his teenage son had ties to a neo-Nazi group; parliamentary hearings were convened, though no legal action was taken against the minister.
Disinformation and alternative media
Moderaterna does not operate a party-controlled media outlet. The party benefits from the editorial sympathy of sections of the centre-right press but does not exert ownership or direct control over any major news organisation. Together with coalition partners Kristdemokraterna and Sverigedemokraterna, Moderaterna has participated in a sustained public debate pressing for stricter or recalibrated regulatory approaches to public service impartiality. The Forssell family affair generated significant media attention but did not involve any attempt to suppress or manipulate coverage. Disinformation and alternative-media DMI risk is low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Moderaterna is a firmly pro-EU and pro-NATO governing party with no documented ties to hostile foreign state financing. The party received approximately SEK 22.8 million in state party subsidies for 2024/25. Its governing role brings structural exposure to lobbying and corporate-interest pressures, but no foreign-state financing concerns have been documented. Foreign-influence DMI risk is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
As the lead governing party since 2022, Moderaterna is structurally positioned to shape the public service framework through mandate engineering, including the 2024–2025 legislative process producing the new Public Service Act and 2026–2033 guidelines. Sweden’s press-freedom monitoring bodies have noted that M, alongside SD and KD, has formally pressed for altered regulatory approaches tied to impartiality debates. Major structural ownership changes in Swedish media, notably Schibsted’s 2025 acquisition of TV4, have occurred on Moderaterna’s governmental watch, increasing cross-platform concentration. The party has lottery operations generating modest commercial income, with a surplus of approximately SEK 1.5 million reported for 2022. Media-capture, advertising and PSB-control DMI risk is medium, reflecting the governing party’s structural leverage over public service design and the concentration dynamics that have emerged during its tenure.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Moderaterna’s most significant legal exposure in the period 2015–2025 arose in 2025, when several municipal politicians in Staffanstorp — including a Moderate municipal leader — were charged with gross misconduct in office (grovt tjänstefel) over decisions allegedly violating obligations under the refugee settlement and placement framework. This case is notable because Swedish prosecutions of elected officials for decisions made in office are relatively uncommon, raising jurisprudential questions about the boundary between political discretion and criminal liability. The 2025 Forssell family affair raised governance and vetting concerns, though no legal proceedings were initiated against the minister. Corruption and institutional-integrity DMI risk is medium, primarily driven by the Staffanstorp gross misconduct charges and the governance question raised by the Forssell episode.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Moderaterna has not been associated with systematic harassment of journalists, SLAPP-style litigation, or economic pressure on independent media. The party’s advocacy for recalibration of public service impartiality standards, while contested by press-freedom organisations, falls within the bounds of legitimate policy debate rather than media suppression. Press-freedom and harassment DMI risk is low to medium, reflecting the governing party’s structural leverage over the legislative environment in which media operate.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low | No party-owned media; no documented disinformation operations; benefits from centre-right editorial sympathy without direct ownership. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro-EU/NATO governing party; public-subsidy dominated funding; no foreign-state financing identified. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Medium | Lead governing party with structural leverage over 2026–2033 PSB framework; co-advocates for PSB impartiality recalibration; Schibsted–TV4 concentration on its watch. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Medium | 2025 Staffanstorp gross misconduct charges against Moderate municipal politicians; Forssell affair raised vetting concerns. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | Low–Medium | No documented harassment; governing leverage over media legislative environment represents a structural risk. |