Sloboda a Solidarita (SaS – Freedom and Solidarity)
EU RANK: 59 (Tier 2: High Performance)
SaS is a liberal‑libertarian, fiscally hawkish party that combines pro‑market economic policies with civil‑liberties positions and generally pro‑EU, pro‑NATO stances. It is in opposition after 2023, vocal on economic governance, media policy and justice reform.
Disinformation and alternative media
SaS communicates mainly through mainstream outlets and its own professional online channels rather than via a dedicated conspiratorial ecosystem. It often allies issue‑wise with independent and liberal media on transparency, anti‑corruption and civil‑rights debates, but without documented ownership or covert control ties. There is no evidence it systematically produces fabricated news or coordinates with pro‑Kremlin or extremist disinformation portals; SaS is more often a participant in institutional debate than a driver of alternative‑media narratives. Disinformation and alternative‑media DMI risk is low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
SaS is broadly pro‑EU and pro‑NATO, though with a history of “soft Euroscepticism” on some integration steps, and supports Western alignment and assistance to Ukraine. Funding data show moderate public subsidies and relatively small‑scale donations, with no documented links to hostile foreign‑state sponsors or opaque cross‑border financing. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Since leaving government, SaS does not control appointments or budgets for public‑service broadcasting and has opposed moves seen as weakening RTVS/STVR independence. It has not been a major actor in oligarchic media‑capture schemes or clientelistic advertising networks; its leverage rests on parliamentary scrutiny and public advocacy rather than structural ownership or state‑advertising flows. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is low.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation mapping from 2015–2025 does not list large grand‑corruption or state‑capture cases centred on SaS leadership; the headline investigations involve networks closer to SMER‑era elites and oligarchs. SaS has positioned itself as a critic of financing opacity and of legal changes that weaken anti‑corruption enforcement, backing constitutional review and transparency in party funding. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is low.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
SaS supports media‑freedom guarantees and generally aligns with independent outlets on resisting political interference, without documented patterns of SLAPP‑type lawsuits, smear campaigns or economic pressure against critical media. Its criticisms of coverage are channelled through open debate and institutional arenas rather than orchestrated harassment or exclusion of unfriendly journalists. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is low.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low | Uses mainstream and own channels; no evidence of fabricated‑news operations or ties to extremist disinformation ecosystems. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro‑EU/NATO with soft Euroscepticism on some issues; no hostile‑state funding indicated in party‑finance data. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Low | Out of government and critical of politicised RTVS/STVR changes; not implicated in major ownership or state‑advertising clientelism. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Low | No major corruption cases focused on SaS; advocates transparency and legal checks on financing and criminal‑law overhauls. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | Low | Supports independent media and does not use systematic legal, economic or intimidation tools against journalists. |