Forum voor Democratie (FvD)
EU RANK: 202 (Tier 5: High Risk)
Forum voor Democratie is a national‑conservative, anti‑globalist and hard‑Eurosceptic party that combines opposition to EU integration with nationalist, anti‑elite rhetoric. Led by Thierry Baudet, FvD holds 3 seats after the 2023 election and remains an outspoken opposition force with a strong online presence.
Disinformation and alternative media
FvD has built one of the largest party‑owned YouTube ecosystems in Dutch politics, using “Forum TV” and other channels to bypass traditional media and distribute long‑form video content directly to supporters. Its strategy combines this owned ecosystem with appearances in sympathetic online shows and, to a lesser extent, commercial talk‑show formats, giving the party substantial control over framing and narrative. Media‑freedom and disinformation analyses note repeated controversies over misleading or conspiratorial content, particularly around COVID‑19 and international politics, placing FvD at the centre of debates on extremist messaging and the spread of disinformation in the Netherlands. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is high.
Foreign influence and external alignments
FvD is hard‑Eurosceptic and sceptical of NATO, positioning itself against mainstream Western foreign‑policy consensus. Financially, the party receives Wfpp public subsidies and reports its accounts to the Ministry of the Interior, while donor‑register compilations for 2022–2025 list about 517,000 euro in disclosed donations, a mid‑range level for Dutch parties. Public information does not document court‑proven hostile‑state funding, but expert commentary has raised concerns about the party’s international alignments and rhetoric, especially its sympathetic stances toward authoritarian actors abroad. In the absence of concrete legal findings, these concerns translate into a moderate foreign‑influence risk rooted more in political alignment and communication than in documented financial capture. Foreign‑influence and external‑alignment DMI risk is moderate.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
FvD does not own traditional broadcasters but exercises strong control over its communication through party‑owned digital media, particularly YouTube and social networks. This owned‑media strategy allows the party to set agendas within its supporter base, reducing reliance on NPO or commercial talk shows and limiting external editorial checks. There is no evidence that FvD has captured public broadcasters or steered state advertising, yet its extensive direct‑to‑audience infrastructure constitutes a powerful parallel ecosystem that partly circumvents standard media‑governance frameworks. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate to high (strong party‑owned digital ecosystem but no control over legacy broadcasters).
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Key court cases involving FvD and its leader focus on speech limits and extremist rhetoric rather than on classic corruption or party‑finance scandals. In December 2021, Amsterdam judges ordered Thierry Baudet to remove social‑media posts comparing COVID‑19 measures to the Holocaust and barred him from reusing Holocaust imagery in that context, illustrating judicial concern about antisemitic instrumentalisation. Additional proceedings highlighted controversies over antisemitic and extremist comments in the party’s youth wing and reputational disputes, though major corruption or embezzlement convictions have not been recorded against the national leadership in 2015–2025. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is moderate (limited financial‑crime exposure but serious rule‑of‑law concerns around court‑defying rhetoric and extremist narratives).
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
FvD frequently attacks established media as biased and hostile, while using its own platforms to promote narratives that question the legitimacy of journalists, public broadcasters and critical outlets. Litigation records show important rulings setting limits on Baudet’s speech, yet there is no extensive pattern of FvD pursuing SLAPP‑type defamation suits to silence reporters; pressure is exerted mainly through rhetoric, online mobilisation and parallel media structures. This environment increases the risk of harassment and intimidation of journalists by supporters, even when not formally organised as legal campaigns. Press‑freedom and harassment‑of‑media DMI risk is high.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | High | Operates a large party‑owned YouTube and online ecosystem, repeatedly linked in analyses to conspiratorial and misleading content, especially on COVID‑19 and geopolitics. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Moderate | Hard‑Eurosceptic, NATO‑sceptic party with standard Wfpp funding and mid‑range disclosed donations; political alignments raise concern but no proven hostile‑state financing. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Moderate–High | Lacks control over legacy broadcasters but maintains a powerful, centrally run digital media network that bypasses conventional editorial safeguards. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Moderate | No major corruption convictions, but court orders against Holocaust analogies and extremist rhetoric reflect significant rule‑of‑law tensions around the party’s communication. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | High | Regularly denounces mainstream media and relies on polarising own platforms, contributing to a climate of hostility toward journalists even without extensive SLAPP litigation. |