Trzecia Droga (Third Way – Polska 2050/PSL)
EU RANK: 69 (Tier 2: High Performance)
Trzecia Droga is a centrist alliance combining the agrarian, Christian‑democratic Polish People’s Party (PSL) with the green‑liberal, reform‑oriented Polska 2050 Szymona Hołowni, positioning itself between PiS and the liberal centre. The bloc won 14.4% of the vote and 65 seats in the 2023 Sejm election, and since December 2023 has governed in coalition with Koalicja Obywatelska and Lewica; Hołownia serves as Marshal of the Sejm, while PSL leader Władysław Kosiniak‑Kamysz is deputy prime minister and defence minister.
Disinformation and alternative media
Third Way’s media influence is largely personal and institutional rather than asset‑based: Sejm Speaker Szymon Hołownia entered politics from television, bringing high name recognition and media fluency that help the alliance frame itself as a moderate alternative to both PiS and KO. Analyses of party–media ties emphasise that Third Way relies on mainstream broadcasters and its leaders’ public profiles, with no evidence of a separate party‑owned TV or press ecosystem or coordinated disinformation operations. Research on Polish alternative right‑wing media highlights TV Republika and online radical networks linked more closely to PiS and Confederation, not to Trzecia Droga. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is low.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Trzecia Droga presents a pro‑EU, pro‑NATO line, combining centrist, Christian‑democratic and green‑liberal strands while advocating institutional reform and decentralisation rather than sovereignty‑based confrontation with Brussels. After the 2023 election, both PSL and Polska 2050 each became entitled to approximately 7.53 million zloty per year in state subvention, under a system where public subsidies dominate party income over 2024–2027. Available finance summaries report no major donation scandals or opaque foreign funding flows involving either partner; their funding is considered routine and compliant with Polish transparency laws. Foreign‑influence and external‑alignment DMI risk is low.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Analyses of media politics in Poland attribute large‑scale public‑media capture and state‑owned‑enterprise advertising abuses primarily to PiS governments, with Third Way featuring instead as a pro‑reform actor in the post‑2023 landscape. The alliance’s leaders have focused on parliamentary rules, depoliticisation rhetoric and institutional change rather than acquiring media assets or leveraging state‑owned companies for partisan communication. No major cases link Third Way to ownership engineering, targeted advertising, or regulatory pressure on broadcasters; its media influence stems from high offices (such as the Sejm speakership) and agenda‑setting within coalition negotiations. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is low.
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Litigation reviews for 2015–2025 note that Third Way’s component parties have not been at the centre of major corruption prosecutions or party‑status court cases during this period. Instead, institutional litigation has involved their leaders in official capacities—for example, Sejm Speaker Hołownia’s role in disputes over PiS politicians’ mandates—where courts and the Constitutional Tribunal assessed procedural issues rather than personal corruption. The dominant integrity scandals of the era, such as the Justice Fund and Pegasus spyware cases, have focused on PiS and allied actors, not on Trzecia Droga. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is low.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Third Way has backed efforts to depoliticise public media and strengthen rule‑of‑law safeguards, criticising both PiS‑era propaganda at TVP and the risk that post‑2023 changes could replicate politicisation if not firmly grounded in law. There is no record in recent litigation or media‑freedom monitoring of the alliance orchestrating SLAPP‑style suits or using legal tools to intimidate journalists; its interventions in media debates occur mainly through parliamentary oversight and coalition policy discussions. Press‑freedom and harassment‑of‑media DMI risk is low.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | Low | Relies on mainstream media and leaders’ personal profiles; no party‑owned broadcast ecosystem or documented disinformation operations. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Low | Pro‑EU, pro‑NATO centrist alliance funded mainly by standard state subventions, with no major foreign‑funding scandals. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Low | Advocates institutional reform and depoliticisation; no links to media‑ownership engineering or SOE‑driven advertising leverage. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Low | Not implicated in major corruption or surveillance scandals; litigation has focused on institutional disputes rather than graft. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | Low | Supports media‑freedom and rule‑of‑law reforms and is not associated with SLAPP‑type litigation or harassment of journalists. |