Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (Confederation Liberty and Independence)
EU RANK: 183 (Tier 5: High Risk)
Konfederacja is a radical‑right, national‑conservative alliance that couples libertarian economics with hardline nationalism, strong anti‑tax and anti‑“big state” positions and a pronounced anti‑EU, anti‑Ukraine and anti‑LGBT profile. It won 7.2% of the vote and 18 seats in the 2023 Sejm election, expanded its European Parliament presence in 2024 (about 12% and its best EU result yet), and has remained a vocal opposition force shaping the right‑wing flank of Polish politics.
Disinformation and alternative media
Confederation relies heavily on an alternative media ecosystem rather than mainstream broadcasters, using TV Republika and a network of YouTube, TikTok‑style and other social‑video channels to reach especially young male audiences. Reporting and audience analyses show TV Republika’s viewership surging after the post‑2023 reset of TVP, with Confederation figures using the channel and online creators to set provocative frames that are then amplified across wider media. This ecosystem has repeatedly carried sensationalist, conspiratorial and extremist narratives, particularly on Ukraine, minorities and COVID‑19, placing Confederation near the centre of concerns about disinformation and radicalising content in Poland. Disinformation/alternative‑media DMI risk is high.
Foreign influence and external alignments
Politically, Confederation is strongly Eurosceptic and sceptical of NATO, often adopting rhetoric sympathetic to other radical‑right and authoritarian actors abroad, especially in debates on Ukraine and EU sanctions. Financially, it receives regular state subventions (about 6.9–8.4 million zloty annually in recent terms) and reported roughly 5.0 million zloty in private donations in 2023, making it unusually reliant on donations relative to its size. Public data do not document court‑proven hostile‑state funding, but the combination of radical foreign‑policy positions, opaque donor structures and a strong presence in alternative media produces a notable, though not legally substantiated, foreign‑influence concern. Foreign‑influence and external‑alignment DMI risk is moderate to high.
Media capture, advertising and public service media
Confederation does not control public broadcasters or major print outlets, but it has embedded itself deeply in the alternative media sphere, particularly through TV Republika and party‑adjacent digital channels. This strategy gives the alliance significant agenda‑setting power among specific audiences while limiting exposure to editorial checks found in mainstream outlets, effectively creating a parallel information space. There is no evidence that Confederation uses state‑owned enterprises or public advertising to capture legacy media, yet its reliance on ideologically aligned private and online platforms creates strong incentives for polarising, outrage‑driven content. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is moderate (soft capture via alternative ecosystems, not state levers).
Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity
Major litigation involving Confederation centres on extremist behaviour and hate speech, especially by MP Grzegorz Braun, rather than on classic corruption or party‑finance scandals. Braun’s high‑profile attack on a Hanukkah menorah with a fire extinguisher inside the Sejm in December 2023 led to lifting of his parliamentary and later European immunity, multiple criminal charges including hate‑motivated offences and public insult, and one of the rare instances of full criminal accountability for extremist conduct by a sitting MP. Additional cases target Braun and other figures over incitement to hatred, threats, obstruction of parliamentary security and public‑order offences, reflecting serious rule‑of‑law concerns even though large‑scale financial corruption has not been established. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is moderate.
Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media
Confederation politicians frequently denounce mainstream media as hostile or “anti‑Polish” and use allied outlets and social channels to attack journalists, minorities and political opponents, contributing to a climate of intimidation. While SLAPP‑type defamation suits are not a central tool of the alliance, repeated hate‑speech incidents, physical disruptions at protests and inflammatory rhetoric—especially from Braun—have triggered multiple criminal investigations and highlight risks to journalists’ safety and minority communities. The party’s communication style and preferred media environment thus reinforce polarisation and undermine efforts to rebuild trust in independent media. Press‑freedom and harassment‑of‑media DMI risk is high.
| Dimension | Risk level | Short justification |
|---|---|---|
| Disinformation & alternative media | High | Heavily dependent on TV Republika and social‑video networks that spread sensationalist and conspiratorial narratives, especially on Ukraine, minorities and COVID‑19. |
| Foreign influence & external alignments | Moderate–High | Strongly anti‑EU/NATO with radical foreign‑policy rhetoric and sizeable donations; no proven hostile‑state funding but elevated alignment‑based concerns. |
| Media capture & advertising / PSB control | Moderate | No control of state media but deep integration into an alternative, ideologically aligned media ecosystem that bypasses mainstream editorial constraints. |
| Corruption & institutional integrity risk | Moderate | Litigation focuses on extremist behaviour and hate crimes (notably Braun’s cases) rather than large‑scale financial corruption, but indicates serious rule‑of‑law tensions. |
| Press freedom & harassment of media | High | Aggressive rhetoric and behaviour toward opponents and minorities, amplified via allied outlets, contributes to an unsafe, hostile environment for journalists and vulnerable groups. |