Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (AUR – Alliance for the Union of Romanians)

EU RANK: 178 (Tier 5: High Risk)

AUR is a radical‑right, ultranationalist and socially conservative party that combines Romanian Orthodox traditionalism, nostalgia for authoritarian figures, anti‑LGBT and anti‑migration positions, and a strong anti‑establishment, anti‑“system” narrative. It rose rapidly after 2019 by mobilising discontent around pandemic restrictions, perceived corruption and cultural‑identity issues, and has become a major parliamentary force.

Disinformation and alternative media

AUR relies heavily on social media, YouTube channels, Telegram groups and sympathetic online portals, forming one of the most active alternative‑media ecosystems in Romania. Media‑monitoring and fact‑checking work for 2020–2025 links AUR leaders and affiliated platforms to repeated dissemination of false or gravely misleading claims about COVID‑19, vaccines, 5G, alleged election fraud, the EU’s intentions toward Romania, and minority groups, often in coordination with pro‑Russian and extremist networks. This ecosystem systematically blurs the line between news and propaganda and has been a key vector for conspiracy theories and polarising narratives. Disinformation and alternative‑media DMI risk is high.

Foreign influence and external alignments

While AUR officially supports Romania’s EU and NATO membership, its leaders frequently attack EU institutions, promote Eurosceptic and sovereigntist rhetoric, and adopt positions that align with pro‑Russian narratives on issues such as sanctions, Ukraine and Western “decadence”. Available party‑funding data for 2019–2024 show income from public subsidies, membership contributions and domestic donations, with no fully documented direct financing by hostile foreign governments, but security and media analyses note overlaps between AUR’s messaging networks and known Russian propaganda and far‑right ecosystems. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is high (based on strong narrative and network alignment, despite lack of proven funding flows).

Media capture, advertising and public service media

AUR does not control national public broadcasters or major legacy media groups, but it has built a powerful parallel information system through its own online channels and collaboration with fringe outlets that depend on party‑linked traffic, donations and merchandising. In local contexts where it has gained influence, there are emerging concerns about pressure on journalists and municipal channels used for propaganda, although large‑scale state‑advertising capture comparable to PSD and PNL is not yet documented. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is high (driven by alternative‑ecosystem dominance and capacity to intimidate rather than classic ownership capture).

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation records from 2019–2024 list a growing number of investigations and court cases involving AUR politicians and activists, including hate‑speech and incitement charges, violent‑incident prosecutions, and disputes about campaign financing and asset declarations, though no single grand‑corruption scheme has so far defined the party. Internal transparency around finances and candidate vetting is weak, and the rapid expansion has brought in individuals with previous legal problems or extremist affiliations. Corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk is moderate to high (coded high because of governance weaknesses and litigation profile).

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

AUR leaders routinely attack journalists and outlets they consider hostile, labelling them “traitors”, “sold to Soros” or enemies of the people, and they often broadcast confrontations with reporters to mobilise supporters. Monitoring reports document coordinated online harassment, doxxing and threats directed at critical journalists and NGOs by AUR supporters, encouraged by incendiary rhetoric from party figures; physical altercations and intimidation have also occurred around protests and public events. While some lawsuits have been filed, reputational and physical intimidation and mass harassment are the primary tools undermining media freedom. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is high.

Dimension	Risk level	Short justification
Disinformation & alternative media	High	Operates one of Romania’s main radical‑right online ecosystems, repeatedly spreading conspiracies and false claims on COVID‑19, EU policy, elections and minorities.
Foreign influence & external alignments	High	Strong narrative and network alignment with pro‑Russian and European far‑right propaganda, despite lack of proven hostile‑state funding.
Media capture & advertising / PSB control	High	Lacks ownership of TVR but dominates alternative platforms and exerts strong pressure on local and online media, fostering a parallel, propaganda‑heavy information sphere.
Corruption & institutional integrity risk	High	Multiple hate‑speech, violence and finance‑related cases, weak internal vetting and transparency amid rapid expansion.
Press freedom & harassment of media	High	Aggressive delegitimisation of journalists, frequent online and offline harassment and intimidation of critical media and NGOs.