SOS România

EU RANK: 182 (Tier 5: High Risk)

SOS România is a radical‑right, ultranationalist, socially conservative party formed around former AUR figure Diana Șoșoacă, with strong anti‑system, anti‑LGBT and anti‑migration positions and frequent appeals to conspiracy narratives. It remains smaller than AUR but has gained disproportionate visibility through media stunts, inflammatory rhetoric and intensive use of social platforms.

Disinformation and alternative media

SOS România operates almost entirely through alternative and social‑media ecosystems: Facebook, TikTok, Telegram, YouTube channels and fringe portals that amplify conspiracies and anti‑establishment narratives. Monitoring reports for 2020–2025 tie SOS leaders and associated channels to repeated dissemination of false or gravely misleading content about COVID‑19, vaccines, alleged Western “dictatorship”, “dictatorial” green and digital policies, and conspiracies about the EU, NATO and minorities, often overlapping with pro‑Russian and broader extremist networks. Disinformation and alternative‑media DMI risk is high.

Foreign influence and external alignments

The party presents itself as a champion of absolute national sovereignty against “Brussels” and “globalism”, regularly attacking EU and NATO institutions and praising or relativising the actions of illiberal and pro‑Russian actors. Available party‑funding data and legal disclosures are limited, but there is no documented, formal direct financing by foreign governments; instead, risk stems from very close narrative alignment and frequent amplification of messaging that mirrors Russian state propaganda and other hostile information campaigns. Foreign‑influence DMI risk is high.

Media capture, advertising and public service media

SOS România does not control national public service media or major commercial broadcasters and has minimal access to state‑advertising levers compared with PSD and PNL. However, it has built a dense network of sympathetic online outlets and influencers whose survival depends on audience donations, merchandising and traffic generated around the party’s provocative content, giving SOS substantial agenda‑setting power within a radical‑right alternative sphere. At local level, there are emerging indications of pressure on municipal and community media where the party has influence, although comprehensive state‑advertising capture is not yet documented. Media‑capture, advertising and PSB‑control DMI risk is high (through parallel‑ecosystem dominance rather than classical ownership capture).

Corruption, litigation and institutional integrity

Litigation and legal‑case compilations list numerous proceedings involving SOS leaders and activists, including charges and investigations related to hate speech, incitement, public‑order offences, obstruction of health measures during the pandemic and defamation. Internal rules on financing transparency, candidate vetting and conflicts of interest are weakly institutionalised, and the party’s rapid, personalised growth around a single leader increases vulnerability to opaque funding channels and ad‑hoc decision‑making. While large‑scale financial‑corruption schemes comparable to old major parties are not yet fully documented, the combination of legal incidents and low governance standards places corruption and institutional‑integrity DMI risk at high.

Press freedom, harassment and treatment of media

SOS România figures frequently attack journalists and outlets they perceive as hostile, using incendiary language, accusations of treason and collaboration with foreign powers, and broadcasting confrontations for mobilisation. Documentation from 2020–2025 highlights online harassment, coordinated trolling and threats against critical reporters, NGOs and minorities, often fuelled by party rhetoric, with several incidents of physical intimidation around protests and public appearances. Press‑freedom and harassment DMI risk is high.

DimensionRisk levelShort justification
Disinformation & alternative mediaHighRelies almost entirely on radical‑right online ecosystems, repeatedly spreading conspiracies and false claims on COVID‑19, EU/NATO, minorities and “globalist” plots.
Foreign influence & external alignmentsHighHard‑Eurosceptic and sovereigntist with strong narrative alignment to Russian propaganda and other hostile information campaigns, though no proven direct state funding.
Media capture & advertising / PSB controlHighNo control of TVR but dominates a tight alternative media network dependent on SOS‑driven traffic and mobilisation, with growing pressure on some local outlets.
Corruption & institutional integrity riskHighMultiple hate‑speech, public‑order and related cases; weak internal transparency and heavy personalisation around the leader increase integrity risks.
Press freedom & harassment of mediaHighSystematic delegitimisation and harassment of journalists and NGOs, including coordinated online abuse and episodes of physical intimidation.